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ABSTRACT

IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN LONG TERM CARE
AND ROGER’S DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION THEORY
Elizabeth M. Shiels
May 11, 2018
Kentucky is one of the top ten states in the U.S. in the number of Presidential
Declarations of Disaster (PDD) over the past ten years.
weather patterns.

This is due to its geology and

The far western portion of Kentucky lies on the New Madrid Seismic

Zone, one of the most dangerous fault lines in the United States; and natural hazards such
as tornadoes, earthquakes, flash floods, severe storms offer only minutes or even seconds
of advance notice. These “no-notice” emergencies with no timely warnings are the most
common hazards experienced in Kentucky.
In these events, individual long term care facilities and local/state responders rely
even more so on good planning (Bolton & Zimmerman, 2007; Waxman et al., 2017).
Emergency responses need to be based on sound plans that are pre-tested using exercises
organized and facilitated by community partners that include first responders. The lessons
learned by the research about solid decision-making for shelter-in-place or evacuation
decisions are just as important in no-notice events as hurricane emergencies.
In 2016, CMS announced a Final Rule for Emergency Preparedness for seventeen
categories of health care providers, including long term care facilities, with a required
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implementation date of November 2017. The components of the CMS Final Rule are
comprehensive, wide-reaching and very new to many LTC facilities creating apprehension,
confusion and a strain on management resources.
The conceptual foundation/theory chosen to assess the process of diffusion,
adoption and implementation of emergency preparedness of KY LTC is Everett Rogers’
Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers,1995). A survey based on best practices for long
term care preparedness was sent to ninety-one KY LTC that had attended training in
emergency preparedness to identify the adoption and implementation levels of their
preparedness and their readiness to reach compliance with the CMS Final Rule. Fifty
completed responses were received and analyzed. Results found that 70% of LTC had
adopted comprehensive best practices and over 74% and 72% had participated in training
and emergency exercises, respectively. A further 90% had established partnerships with
their first responders and/or participated in their regional health care coalitions.
Evacuation preparedness presents a gap in planning and requires ongoing support
and emphasis. Diffusion of Innovation theory proved valuable in measuring the impact of
relationships, communication and overall preparedness. The theory also identified the
significance of change agents as key players in diffusion and adoption resulting in
implementation. The most utilized change agents were the KY Emergency Preparedness
for Aging & LTC Program, the two state long term care associations and the KY Office of
Inspector General. Regional health care coalitions were found to be the major source of
preparedness networking.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem
“No-notice catastrophic disasters pose one of the greatest challenges to national
emergency
preparedness, whether caused by manmade attacks or natural
events…For example, federal emergency response planning estimates on the
consequences of a catastrophic earthquake along known fault lines in the central
United States include impacts to multiple states and more specifically project over
75,000 casualties (injured and fatalities), more than 380,000 displaced from their
homes and
communities, at least 330,000 buildings moderately or severely
damaged, and direct economic losses surpassing $200
billion”.
(p.1,
Government Accountability Office, 2014).
Kentucky is one of the top ten states in the U.S. in the number of Presidential
Declarations of Disaster (PDD) over the past ten years. This is due to its geology and
weather patterns.

The far western portion of Kentucky lies on the New Madrid Seismic

Zone, one of the most dangerous fault lines in the United States; and natural hazards such
as tornadoes, earthquakes, flash floods, severe storms offer only minutes or even seconds
of advance notice. These “no-notice” emergencies with no timely warnings are the most
common hazards experienced in Kentucky. Since 2008, the risk to Kentucky
experiencing one or more no-notice events has increased. The combination of increased
likelihood of incidence, severity, and disastrous impact on life and infrastructure place
287 Kentucky long term care (LTC) facilities at critical risk for hazardous outcomes.
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The complexity of community response in a no-notice event involves multiple
response agencies, jurisdictions, effective communication between responders and
jurisdictional leadership and the community, transportation planning and resilience on the
part of the affected populations (Waxman et al., 2017; Bolton & Zimmerman, 2007). In
order to increase the preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake originating from the New
Madrid Seismic Zone, a potentially catastrophic no-notice disaster, Congress mandated a
National Level Disaster Exercise be conducted in 2011 across the states most at-risk for
severe damage. Eight at-risk states were identified: Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky,
Indiana, Illinois, Mississippi, Arkansas and Alabama. The epicenter of a 7.7 scale
earthquake on the New Madrid fault would likely be Memphis, Tennessee. Each state
developed their own exercise to respond to the degree of risk identified by the U.S.
Geological Service (USGS, 2011). USGS applied current technology to the original data
based on damage experienced during the great New Madrid earthquake of 1811.
Under these circumstances, Kentucky is estimated to experience catastrophic
damage in the far western regions of the state with an estimated 300 fatalities and 7,000
casualties. These estimates, however, do not include the approximate 4,400 licensed
nursing facility beds, 2,400 personal care beds, and 4,000 persons daily receiving home
health services who would be especially vulnerable to a catastrophic event. (USGS, 2011).
Damage to buildings, hospitals, schools and family dwellings would be
severe with almost one-third of all structures in KY receiving moderate to severe damage.
Structural damage to buildings would include severe impact to all hospitals in three western
regions such that they would be inoperable. All nursing homes would be significantly
impacted ranging from total destruction to loss of working utilities including phone, water,
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heat and air conditioning. It is estimated that all residents living in the western regions of
Kentucky (1-3) would have to evacuate under these catastrophic conditions. Those
facilities in the least impacted region could experience sinkhole damage or, at a minimum,

Figure 1
not be able to operate without State and Federal assistance with needed resources for at
least two weeks (USGS, 2011). The minimum level of impact could produce damage to
infrastructure with loss of generator power due to lack of fuel supplies and travel bans due
to poor road conditions.
All road and river transportation would be closed due to destruction and
potential non-navigable river conditions. Air transport would be the only means of
transport in or out of Region 1 (Jackson Purchase). Estimates of public and private access
to helicopters suggests that even if all Department of Defense (DOD) helicopters were
recalled from combat zones, there would not be an adequate supply to respond to the
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evacuation need. The severity of impact to this region would be immediately devastating
and would remain so for many years to come.
The Pennyroyal region (Region 2) could experience significant power, water,
telephone outages, sinkhole damage, and impassible road conditions. Recovery response
could take up to two weeks for the region to be moderately functional. The Green River
region (Region 3) would experience some liquefaction, mainly in cities and counties
bordering the Ohio River.

Infrastructure could be severely damaged requiring some

evacuations and at least a month long delay in its replacement. Facilities with less
significant damage could have water, power, sanitation and telephone access restored to a
sufficient degree within that timeframe. Some areas of the region could provide support to
those farther west and south.
Needless to say, the impact on the LTC facilities in the three regions (20 counties)
at the highest risk for no-notice events is a major concern to planners, policymakers and
responders as would be their concern for the impact on hospitals and other critical
infrastructure. An analysis of LTC average daily census in the three regions most at-risk
indicates that if all LTC facilities in the three regions needed to evacuate, there would be a
statewide shortage of 2281 licensed beds in LTC facilities available to receive evacuees
(KY CHFS, 2013).
States with frequent hurricanes know this planning very well and have
transportation agreements in place, emergency supply storage, vendor agreements and
alternate care sites pre-established with sufficient time to evacuate before the event.
Kentucky, however, experiences disaster events with little-to-no advance notice. By the
time the event occurs, transportation systems could be fully assigned elsewhere and road
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access could be damaged and impassable. Selection of alternate care sites for evacuation
in a catastrophic disaster in Kentucky would require the best-available option, that is a
“stable” building in closest proximity to the damaged facility. LTC facilities would be on
their own to transport residents, food, supplies, mattresses, medications, client records,
assistive devices, and medical equipment literally down the street to a “stable” building
until help could arrive within 72-96 hours. LTC facilities located in rural areas have fewer
options as proximity to alternative sheltering is significantly less than urban LTC sheltering
locations and longer travel distances are involved. In that case, good relationships with
neighbors with tractors, trucks and other vehicles would be the only option.
HOLLYWOOD, Florida—After an estimated 215 people died in hospitals and
nursing homes in Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, policy makers
realized that the nation’s health care institutions were ill-equipped for disasters.
One of the rules they created after years of discussion looked especially prescient
in light of the tragic deaths on Wednesday of eight nursing home residents in
Florida’s post-hurricane heat. But the rule, powering supplies and temperature
control, will not be enforced until November….” (Neil Reisner and Sheri Fink, Sept.
14, 2017; The New York Times).
Following the hurricane season of 2005, beginning in 2006, the Office of Inspector
General, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) reported out the results of a
study to assess nursing home performance during the hurricanes of 2004-2005. As a result,
recommendations were issued for “guidelines” for comprehensive emergency
preparedness for long term care facilities (CMS, 2006, 2013). The guidelines, however,
have been voluntary. In 2016, CMS announced a Final Rule for Emergency Preparedness
for seventeen categories of health care providers, including long term care facilities, with
a required implementation date of November 2017. The components of the CMS Final
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Rule are comprehensive, wide-reaching and very new to many LTC facilities creating
apprehension, confusion and a strain on management resources.
Between the 2006 issuance of recommended guidelines and November 2017, the
United States has experienced catastrophic hurricanes with Hurricane Irene in 2011,
Hurricane Sandy in 2012, and Hurricanes Harvey and Irma in 2017. In the absence of
comprehensive preparedness planning, evacuation decision-making and emergency
response implementation, the same issues of vulnerability of long term care residents’
safety remain.
An estimated 48 million or 14.9% of the U.S. population is 65 or older
(Administration on Aging [AOA], 2016). The Administration on Aging (AOA) estimates
the majority of older persons have at least one chronic health condition with the average
number increasing with age. The most common chronic conditions include hypertension
(72%), arthritis (50%), heart disease (30%), cancer (24%), and diagnosed diabetes (20%).
Approximately 35.9% of older persons report some type of disability, be it hearing, vision,
cognition, or independent living difficulty (AOA, 2013). These functional limitations
become severe and increase with age. For instance, it has been reported that 83% of
Medicare beneficiaries have difficulty with at least one or more activities of daily living
(ADLs), such as bathing, ambulation, eating, dressing oneself, toileting and transferring.
Sixty-seven percent had difficulty with three or more activities of daily living (AOA,
2010).
By the end of 2014, an estimated 1.4 million persons in the U.S. lived in long term
care (LTC) facilities representing 2.6% of the over-65 and 9.5% of the 85+ year old
population. Almost half of nursing home residents need assistance with four out of five
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ADLs (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid [CMS], 2009). In 2014, approximately 61.4%
of nursing home or LTC facility residents had moderate to severe cognitive impairment
with 38.7% having severe impairment. An estimated 38.7% of residents had none to mild
cognitive impairment with Kentucky numbers running less than the national average,
suggesting well over 61% have some form of cognitive impairment (CMS, 2016).
Given their advanced age, physical and cognitive difficulties, the elderly have little
physical or emotional reserve remaining to cope with other stressors, particularly the stress
of a natural disaster (Fernandez, 2002; Johnson et al., 2006; Mokdad et al., 2005). Special
needs are more likely to arise for the elderly during and after a natural disaster or terror
attack. Cognitive impairment can be exacerbated. Evacuation can create disorientation,
trauma response or potentially death and refusal to evacuate can put them at greater risk of
disability, disease or death (Pekovic, Seff, & Rothman, 2008). Vulnerability of homedwelling elders increases in prolonged power outages as access to nutrition, power needs
for medical equipment, and physical access to first responders is compromised. Caregiver
abandonment of the frail elderly have also occurred before they can be evacuated to a
shelter (Silverman & Weston, 1995).
Elders are at greater risk for illness and death due to exposure to the heat and the
cold during and in the aftermath of a natural disaster. For instance, during the Chicago
Heat Wave of 1995, of the close to 700 deaths that occurred, the median age of the deceased
was 75 (Semenza et al., 1996; Aldrich & Benson, 2008) and 72% of the heat-related deaths
were persons 65 and older (Whitman et al., 1997). Most recently, during Hurricane Irma
in Florida in 2017, eight (8) residents of a nursing facility in Hollywood, Florida, died from
heat exposure during a storm-related power outage.
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Even prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, natural disasters during
the 1990s (i.e. hurricanes, earthquakes, ice storms and prolonged power outages) had
already highlighted the special vulnerabilities of older persons and the health care systems
serving them. Vulnerabilities, especially for those living in LTC facilities, included illequipped community shelters. The time required for evacuating elders to shelters was
significantly longer than for non-frail persons; critical personal identification information
often was lacking such as name, picture IDs, special needs identification, health conditions
and medication requirements.
The capacity to manage the needs of LTC facilities’ staff and the rest of the
community was greatly stressed during Hurricane Andrew in 1992. One 500-bed nursing
facility swelled by an additional 500 family members of staff and community-dwelling
frail elders needing shelter and medical assistance in the face of electrical and water outages
(Silverman & Weston, 1995). During the Northridge, California earthquake in 1994, not
only did twenty-three long term care facilities sustain significant damage with five facilities
finding it necessary to close, 52% of nursing facilities admitted evacuees from hospitals,
other nursing facilities and community-dwellings housing elders (Saliba, Buchanan &
Kington, 2004) swelling their populations in the midst of severe utility outages.
The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center Towers created mass structural
devastation to the buildings, to the neighborhoods surrounding the towers and placed a
never-before experienced strain on first responders and their communication networks and
infrastructure including land lines and cell phones, hospitals, and transportation resources.
A review of the published literature on managing disasters and recovery efforts in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks underscored time and time again that the greatest gaps in the
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response to the unprecedented tragedy occurred in communication between and among
responders, among families and business that can be best stated as the inadequate capacity
to respond, protect, and defend citizens and property on US soil (General Accounting
Office, 2006). First responder agencies, such as fire departments, police, emergency
medical services and private security personnel had no means of communication across
agencies. Each agency operated its own communication network using its own frequencies
and types of communication equipment so responders from different agencies had no way
of knowing what was happening in overall incident response. This led to hundreds of deaths
of responder personnel and created barriers to other response agencies to back-up and
support first responders (GAO, 2006).

Communication was also severely hampered

among family members trying to contact each other to make sure they were safe; employers
were unable to contact employees to maintain company operations; and, healthcare
personnel were unable to track patient activity or deceased patients. Telephone usage was
so great coming in and going out of the New York area that the telecommunications
networks did not function. Family members went for days and weeks without knowing if
their loved ones were safe or in the hospital or possibly dead (GAO, 2006)
Later it was found that isolated frail seniors living alone, possibly harmed from
toxic exposure to the air and without food or necessary resources, were not identified for
over a week because responders and providers did not know they were there. Another
barrier was identification and assessment of the status of frail elders living in the area
adjacent to the attack site because providers of care for elders were not permitted in the
area of the attacks. Children in day care in the surrounding area, however, were identified
within hours because there was a family member who knew where they were. It only took
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days for house pets to be checked and identified because owners knew where they were.
The isolated frail seniors who did not have family waited for the system to get to them
(O’Brien, 2003), indicative of how little emphasis had been given to elder safety and
preparedness.
What was most apparent from the terror attack was the nation was not prepared to
respond in a coherent, collaborative, effective manner to a major disaster from an internal
threat or an external threat with no advance notice. Lack of preparedness crossed all lines
including the emergency response network, the healthcare system, public health as well as
individuals, families and organizations.
Three parallel efforts related to strengthening the health care system response
followed on the heels of the 9/11 attacks: 1) the vulnerability of special populations,
particularly older persons, 2) changes in and funding to the national preparedness structure,
and 3) more clarity for the role of the health care system. Homeland Security was mandated
to establish an Emergency Response Plan. The Plan’s objectives were to combine a wide
variety of Federal plans into one comprehensive plan to address the prevention,
preparedness, response and recovery phases of emergency events incorporating all
disciplines and addressing all-hazards ranging from natural disasters to manmade disasters
(2002). The Plan called for coordination of incidents that reach beyond local and State
capabilities while integrating local and State jurisdictions in coordination, communication
and incident management structures. While hospitals were accredited by The Joint
Commission regarding emergency preparedness for many years, no such depth of
requirements existed for long term care facilities at the Federal or State levels.
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At the state level, Kentucky’s Division of Emergency Management (KYEM) is the
state equivalent of FEMA and is tasked with creating a statewide system of mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery. It includes development of an overall State
Emergency Management (EM) Plan and management of the state Emergency Operations
Center. Kentucky EM is prepared to respond to any event twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week. Its authority is derived from the Kentucky legislature (KRS 39) and the
Federal National Response Framework. Kentucky Emergency Management (KYEM)
appoints regional emergency managers across 14 regions in the state. Under Federal
statute, each county and political jurisdiction must also have an emergency manager. These
county emergency managers report to the local county judge or mayor. Kentucky has 120
counties, each with a County Judge Executive. There are 120 county emergency managers
in the Commonwealth each with a different chain of command.
Following hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Congress transferred preparedness funding
to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness and Recovery (ASPR). Federal funding shifted away from bioterrorism
and weapons of mass destruction to preparedness for any threat to a locale, a County, or
region (all-hazards) whether it is a natural threat or manmade threat. The Kentucky
Department of Public Health (KDPH) has responsibility for the same mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery coordination in matters regarding the public’s health.
The KDPH preparedness branch coordinates and collaborates with KYEM and is an
integral partner on most matters relating to Kentucky preparedness and response.
KDPH also administers the Kentucky Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) on
behalf of the Department of Health and Human Services ASPR funding. The HPP program
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is organized into 13 HPP regions with regional health care coalitions. Hospital
Preparedness regional health care coalitions meet monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly
depending on the structure of each region to address hospital and other healthcare
organizations all-hazards preparedness for and response to biological, environmental and
weather-related disasters. These include tornados, floods, power outages, pandemic flu,
chemical attack and/or spills and other national events that effect the operations of
healthcare organizations and their patients, including hospitals and nursing facilities.
HPP regional health care coalition members include regional and local emergency
managers, hospital management, health planners, as well as representatives from mental
health, long term care representatives, Emergency Medical Services, Veterans
Administration, Fire Service, schools of public health and social work among others. The
range of membership representation suggests the variety of response and planning agencies
that work together on a regular basis to coordinate efforts and share learning. Participating
members are required to be knowledgeable about preparedness and be certified in the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS). The
HPP regional health care coalitions are organized by Area Development Districts and
monthly or quarterly regional Coalition members meet to share their planning and lessons
learned from regional events.
The functions of the Kentucky HPP include:


A regular forum for the healthcare community and first responders at the county,
regional and state level to promote emergency preparedness;



Coordinate and improve delivery of health care response in an emergency;



Foster communication among members at all levels on preparedness and response;
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Ensure community response readiness through training and exercises;



Promote preparedness in the healthcare community through standardized practices
and integration with response partners.
(www.louisvilleky.gov/Health/HERA.com)
KDPH staff had been tasked with recruiting the long-term care providers to

participate in the regional hospital preparedness coalitions since the original HRSA funding
of 2002. The KDPH Preparedness Branch had attempted to work with long term care for
two years with little success. KDPH set aside $100,000 of ASPR funds to create an
incentive for long term care facilities specifically to participate in the regional HPP
program for equipment and training purchases. KDPH had also purchased a national LTC
training model for all Kentucky LTC facilities under the condition the facilities attend a
train-the-trainer session and take the training back to their facilities/regions. Neither of the
efforts proved effective. Of the $100,000 made available to LTC, approximately $70,000
went unspent. A number of facilities sent trainers and ultimately nothing happened beyond
that. Facilities did not incorporate the national model nor train staff. Financial incentives
did not work.
In 2008, the KDPH Preparedness Branch asked the University of Kentucky and
University of Louisville to shift focus from their effort of bioterrorism training of
community-based agencies serving seniors to an HPP all-hazards’ preparedness approach
for KY LTC facilities. That effort provided training to community-based agencies serving
seniors in bioterrorism, all-hazards and pandemic flu preparedness. The two universities
had worked with all of the regional Area Agencies on Aging in the state and developed
partnerships with public health emergency planners, trainers and coordinators across the
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state as well as county emergency managers. The community-based aging agencies served
by the universities had come a long way during that time to develop organizational plans
and foster staff individual and family plans. Based on that success, KDPH asked the
partnership to attempt to make headway with long term care.
KDPH contracted with gerontology faculty from KY’s two largest universities to
engage long term care and the Hospital Preparedness Program coalitions with the creation
of the KY Emergency Preparedness for Aging & LTC Program (KYEPA). One of the
initial objectives of the new program was to increase the number of KY LTC facilities’
involvement in their HPP regional health care preparedness coalitions, and second, to
expand the capacity of Kentucky’s long term care facilities to respond to disasters by
creating a statewide manual specifically for long term care and to train KY LTC facilities
in the National Incident Management System Incident Command System (NIMS). Partners
were added each year as products, tools and training were developed to meet the most
recent needs.
LTC facilities were highly resistant to anyone carrying the message, “I am from the
state or HPP and I am here to help”. After all, the LTC industry is so heavily regulated
that facilities do not welcome any additional requirements and the state regulators report
to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services regional offices. The last step for
Kentucky preparedness with LTC was to go outside of the department to persons with
knowledge of and relationships with the aging network.
A string of years of very severe weather impacted the state (2008-2010), especially
the western part of the state. Interest in attending trainings and coalition meetings increased
as regions experienced storms. The KYEPA program provided training through the HPP
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regional health care coalitions, state LTC associations, emergency management, state
Department of Homeland Security, aging networks among others. Ease of access to
training and coalition activities were supported by partner organizations, electronic media
and live presentations.
A handful of long term care administrators and staff had attended some HPP
regional health care coalition meetings. These early adopters struggled to stay engaged
because of the disparate cultures of organizations around the tables. Emergency
management language was alienating, hierarchical and militaristic. Long term care was
viewed as a source of surge capacity for hospitals with the hospitals offering nothing in
return. In fact, in some HPP regional health care coalition meetings, hospital
representatives actually told the group that “long term care should not be there because
there were not enough resources to share with them and they never wanted to hear the
phrase long term care again”. The special needs and vulnerabilities of the nursing facility
population did not factor into the picture. This changed with the 2005 hurricane season.
The lack of CMS regulations was a barrier to adoption of emergency preparedness
plans by LTC facilities. Regulations were limited to very few elements and some lacked
specificity. LTC State surveyors followed criteria for preparedness established under
Sections 1819 and 1919 of the Social Security Act. These are identified in State surveyor
requirements of:


F517 “The facility must have detailed written plans in emergency procedures to
meet all potential emergencies and disasters, such as fire, severe weather and
missing residents…”
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F518

“The facilities must train all employees in emergency procedures with

existing staff, and carry out unannounced staff drills using those procedures”
(DHHS, 2006).
The unannounced drills typically are applied to the mandatory fire drills required
four times a year. Facilities are also required to have a backup generator with the ability
to power emergency lighting and power outlets for life-sustaining equipment. Additional
requirements include emergency supplies of food and water supplies, up to 2-3 days, and
to identify an alternate care site in the event of an evacuation.
Coastal states, especially Florida and Texas, have legislated best practices well
beyond the CMS regulations. Kentucky’s emergency plan had only 8 out of the 22 (36%)
requirements in place (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Kentucky and Gulf State Requirements for Nursing Home
Emergency Plans
State Requirements
KY AL* FL LA MS
Community coordination
X
X
X
Hazard analysis
X
X
Communication
X
X
Direction and control
X
X
X
Specific resident needs
X
X
X
Staffing
X
X
X
Emergency food, water, supplies
X
X
X
X
Emergency power
X
X
X
Medications
X
X
X
Evacuation procedures
X
X
X
X
Evacuation route
X
Transportation
X
X
X
Host facility agreement
X
X
X
Transfer of medical records
X
Re-entry
X
X
Document training and drills
X
X
X
X
Reviewed annually
X
X
Staff telephone lists
X
X
X
Responding to family inquiries
X
X
Individual identification of residents
X
Designated area for supply storage
X
*Alabama relies on Federal
requirements.
Source: Office of Inspector General analysis of State administrative code and
requirements in four Gulf States, (2006).
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TX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

A 2006 study, funded by the Federal Office of the Inspector General following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, changed the awareness of LTC preparedness planning. It
found that 94% of LTC facilities in their survey did indeed have emergency plans and 80%
had completed staff training in emergency planning, meeting the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services’ (CMS) requirements at the time. However, the content of the plans
was found to be lacking in specificity as there were no precise CMS guidelines met or
followed as to what comprises an emergency plan. Further, the study found that in the face
of an emergency, administrators did not follow their plans, contributing to unsafe
conditions and increased potential for death and injury (DHHS, 2006). Recommendations
from this original 2006 study were summarized into two categories: 1) CMS should provide
more specific requirements for emergency plans and, 2) CMS make clear its support for
communication between LTC facilities and emergency responders.

Based on these

recommendations, CMS issued a 25-item recommended checklist for LTC plans.
A 2012 Office of Inspector General follow-up report of national compliance for
emergency preparedness regulations from 2007-2010 found that compliance with these
same regulations had decreased to 92% and 72%, respectively. In the meantime, CMS had
issued recommended checklists to LTC, State survey agencies and LTC Ombudsman
providing greater specificity and detail as to tasks to be incorporated in comprehensive
emergency plans.
There are stark examples of the risks to nursing home facilities or LTC in disasters
whether they be related to hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, or flooding. And yet, even
after catastrophic disasters that clearly put LTC residents in danger, long term care facilities
have been reluctant to implement comprehensive disaster planning. In an environment
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where CMS, the chief regulatory agency for LTC, only provided “recommendations” about
preparedness compared to literally thousands of regulations for LTC in general, are there
effective ways to engage LTC or LTC to improve voluntary preparedness?
Purpose of study
Although studies of LTC preparedness planning have been published in response
to hurricanes in particular, the research studies investigating the degree of preparedness
planning among LTC in no-notice disaster states are virtually non-existent. Previous LTC
studies have focused on responses to catastrophic disasters such as hurricanes identifying
steps in planning and mitigation that might have lessened the loss of life, damage to facility
infrastructure and vulnerability of the population. The research has significantly
contributed to the knowledge base of effective LTC preparedness and provides
recommendations specific to anticipated, frequent disasters where pre-storm response to
impending storms can be implemented days in advance enhancing safety and quality of
life. This is not the case with no-notice events.
The purpose of this study is to add to this research and has two specific aims. The
first is to conduct an analysis of the status of LTC preparedness in a no-notice state,
highlighting state efforts to strengthen LTC preparedness and illuminate the gaps in
preparation related to its voluntary nature in years prior to the CMS Final Rule. The study
will assess Kentucky long term care emergency preparedness based on a survey
administered to one-third of LTC facilities in 2014, particularly facilities that have been
exposed to planning and training events for emergency preparedness. The second is to
apply aspects of Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers, 2003) to examine the diffusion,
adoption and implementation of emergency planning practices both mandated and
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voluntary for LTC facilities, especially in light of the promulgation of comprehensive new
regulations. The two foci identify the status of one-third of Kentucky LTC facilities in
regards to their preparedness for a no-notice event and identify the use of private and public
supports that contributed to LTC facilities readiness for emergencies and the new
regulations.
Importance of the Study to Social Work
This study is important to social work for several reasons. It amplifies the role social
work can play in the diffusion of new ideas. Historically, public health as a discipline has
been the “natural” partner in training, managing exercise, motivating health care providers
to make voluntary prevention changes and collaborating with emergency management.
Social work brings a perspective of the person-in-environment and a tradition of
relationship-building, especially in the field of aging, that also makes it a “natural” partner
as well. Social workers serve in front line positions in LTC and can relate to the impact of
regulations and resident-related issues that arise every day in a practice setting.
Leadership in health care advocacy, aging collaborations and the strength of its
networks placed the opportunity for the Kentucky program to succeed. Relationships with
state LTC associations contributed to the dissemination of new information and access to
training settings never before available. The pathways identified with the spread of
knowledge about innovation outside of the typical populations in social work serve to
expand the opportunities for translation to practice and well-being of very vulnerable
populations.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous research
As far back as Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the gaps in understanding needs of frail
elders during disasters living in long term care were recognized (Silverman & Weston,
1995) and identified the biggest gaps as evacuation planning, communications, staffing and
patient care. Frail elders were identified as extremely vulnerable in disasters following
9/11 (Johnson et al., 2006). The largest body of research on nursing home emergency
preparedness has come out of the 2005 hurricane season that included Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. And, the greatest area of focus has been evacuation planning, transportation
issues, evacuation decision-making, evacuation outcomes among the lessons learned
related to evacuation (Dosa et al., 2007; Hyer, et al., 2012). This is understandable as the
research has looked at catastrophic events in coastal areas where evacuation is the best
option for the community including long term care facilities. The most frequent type of
event fitting those characteristics are hurricanes.
A unique characteristic of hurricanes compared to other catastrophic events is that
there is often advance notice of 3-5 days that the storm is coming and the potential scope
of impact as in Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Harvey and Irma. This enables long term care
administrators, emergency managers and first responders to evacuate facilities well in
advance of the event. Transportation is problematic for LTC facilities as the logistics of
evacuation in a catastrophic event are very complex. Determining evacuation zones and
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their timing is challenging, evacuation too early can place residents at unnecessary risk
(Dosa et al., 2007). If an entire neighborhood or community have to evacuate and all of
the transportation resources are needed at the same time, it may be difficult to establish
priority populations for limited transportation resources (Chiu & Zheng, 2007). Lack of
coordination between local, state and national transportation resources may create delays
in response (Chiu & Zheng, 2007). This also applies to coordination and collaboration with
county emergency management.
There has also been a lack of clarity in the effective decision-making process to
evacuate. How are risks weighed to evacuate or shelter-in-place? Sheltering in-place is
the preferred option. Staff are already on-site, there may be space to shelter their families
to ensure their availability and residents face fewer negative outcomes in a shelter-in-place
situation. Sufficient provisions of water, food, medications are critical in sheltering-inplace as is adequate power supply. During a major disaster LTC facilities’ fuel supplies
may run out after 2-4 days. Transportation of backup fuel supplies may be hampered by
routes being clogged or debris in the roads impeding transport. The same is true as to
assignment of evacuees to sheltering in other long term care facilities or shelter space.
When a health care facility reaches maximum capacity to respond in an emergency
and needs to send or “surge” patients to alternate sites during emergencies because
incoming casualties placed pressure on the hospital’s capacity to absorb them while serving
existing patients (Hick et al., 2014), demands for bed space become overwhelming to the
point that hospitals may discharge less acute patients to other hospitals or even nursing
homes. In even the most common emergency situation for LTC, evacuation due to a fire,
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receiving LTC facilities are limited by regulation to accept only as many evacuees from
hospitals or other LTC as they have licensed beds available. In sum, the logistics of
emergency response is only as effective as the degree of planning. The unanticipated
variables are so varied that all the best planning can be for naught in a major event;
however, in the absence of planning, the event will manage the response versus the facility
response managing the event.
A major gap in the long-term care emergency preparedness literature relates to the
experience of no-notice emergencies compared to advance notice events and voluntary
adoption of comprehensive preparedness. The hurricane states have regulations that cover
pre-incident response with 3-5 days advance notice during which target zones plan
evacuation routes, mandatory evacuation and statewide sheltering, the coordination and
assignment of buses, vans, ambulances, and other transportation resources.
Kentucky is not a coastal state and is in a “no-notice” zone where events occur,
especially catastrophic events, without advance notice. In these events, individual long
term care facilities and local/state responders rely even more so on good planning
(Waxman et al., 2017; Bolton & Zimmerman, 2007). Emergency responses need to be
based on sound plans that are pre-tested using exercises organized and facilitated by
community partners that include first responders. The lessons learned by the research about
solid decision-making to shelter-in-place or evacuate are just as important to no-notice
events. These include having transportation agreements within the impact area and outside
of 50 miles as well as similar agreements with other long term care facilities to receive
evacuees, again in close proximity and beyond 50 miles.
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In most cases, long term care facility emergencies are specific to a single facility,
not a community event. In the event of a community event, prolonged shelter-in-place is
more likely than immediate evacuation as the resources for available beds and
transportation may not be available. Again, this is especially true in a no-notice event.
Therefore, the ability to shelter-in-place with sufficient water, food, medication and
supplies and fuel for the backup generator become critical.
CMS had not been willing to commit comprehensive preparedness to regulation
until 2016-2017. Up to that time, state regulations and voluntary adoption and
implementation of emergency preparedness have had to fill the many voids. Support for
emergency preparedness for LTC has been driven by the DHHS Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) through the Hospital Preparedness
Program.
One of the success stories from the 2005 hurricane season in Florida was the
development of collaboration between the two state LTC associations and the state survey
agency. A similar process was developed in Kentucky by the KYEPA program. The goals
included creating a common state manual for LTC preparedness, engaging LTC in
preparedness planning and participation in HPP regional health care coalitions. The
Kentucky approach engaged LTC and health care policy stakeholders, change agents, LTC
champions, regulators and HPP regional health care coalitions as well as state LTC
associations. These disparate and often conflictual entities posed challenges and provided
opportunities for collaboration.
Program activities included:


Development of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual
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Partnering with HPP regional health care coalitions to sponsor program
training to LTC



Partnering with the two state LTC associations to sponsor annual training
at association conferences



Creating opportunities for LTC facility leadership to serve on panels during
program trainings to share their experiences with other LTC about recent
emergencies



Providing training to state and regional first responder organizations about
LTC preparedness



Working with the State Survey Agency (KY OIG) to create preparedness
resources that integrate current regulations with evacuation planning and
receiving evacuees during an emergency



Partnering with the KY OIG to provide preparedness training to state LTC
and state survey staff



Program integration with all HPP regional health care organizations



Development of emergency exercise scenarios for LTC tabletop exercises
and HPP regional health care coalition community exercises



Providing 24/7 situational awareness for the state health operations center
during emergencies involving LTC



Participation in state-level policy committees focused on emergency
preparedness and response
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Conceptual foundation/theory
The conceptual foundation/theory chosen to assess the process of diffusion,
adoption and implementation of emergency preparedness of KY LTC is Everett Rogers’
Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers,1995). Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) research
has been applied widely to many different fields of innovation. A meta-analysis
undertaken by Greenlaugh et al. (2004) found thirteen different disciplines with a
research tradition of diffusion and adoption literature. In addition, research also included
adoption of technological innovations and health care (Peeters, JE de Veer, van der Hoek,
& Francke, 2012), farming (McGrath, & Zell, 2001), banking (Gopallakkrishnan,
Wischnevsky, & Damanpour, 2003), intervention research in third world countries (
Pandey & Yadama, 1992), public health ( Katz, 1963; Haider & Kreps, 2004), health
promotion (Ferrence, 2001), drug prevention (Pankratz, Hallfors, & Cho, 2002), and
counseling (Murray, 2009) among many others. Its application to LTC emergency
preparedness provides constructs with which to assess elements of diffusion of LTC
preparedness as an innovation, adoption of core preparedness elements mandated by
CMS prior to 2016 and the implementation of voluntary comprehensive preparedness
across KY LTC. Diffusion theory has been selected to also identify and explain
pathways of communication that have been effective for KY LTC in learning about the
innovation, hearing from peers as to its usefulness in emergencies, becoming familiar
with resources that represent best practices, connecting with established HPP regional
health care coalitions of response partners, and ways to test facility plans for continuous
improvement.
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Diffusion of Innovation Theory
Diffusion of innovation theory (DOI) was developed by Everett Rogers in 1962. It
was first applied in agricultural research and hybrid seed corn use; and today is one of the
most widely applied theories across a wide range of fields of study such as agriculture,
anthropology, technology, medicine and healthcare, public health, community
development, marketing and management (Rogers, 2003). Its roots derive from Gabriel
Tarde, one of the fathers of sociology and social psychology who studied attributes that
influence adoption of new ideas and explained the ones that were successful and
unsuccessful.
Diffusion of innovation theory is applicable to understanding the processes of the
passive spread (diffusion) of an innovation, adoption or acceptance of an innovation which
is defined here as a new idea, process, technology or application and the implementation
of actual practices in an organization which produces a change to the culture of the
organization. It helps to explain a new idea as it is being applied. It can also be used to
bring greater awareness to the communication mechanism between and among the parties
involved in the process.
Most innovations, especially prevention focused changes (Rogers, 2003, p.234),
take substantial time to diffuse sufficiently across a social system in order to create social
change. Some innovations take less time as they create new programs, products and
processes heretofore not used. Prevention-focused changes take more time because
adopters are changing existing systems that have been in place for long periods of time.
The time factor in the rate of diffusion can delay or impede its adoption.
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A final critical element in diffusion of innovation theory is the social system itself
that is experiencing the adoption process. The size, structure, scale and nature of the social
system can encourage or impede adoption of the innovation as “users may not be the
choosers” (Dearing, 2009). In long term care, the adopters would likely be administrators,
leaders with the influence to direct facility resources and staff in this new direction. In
many cases, the person delegated with the responsibility to implement comprehensive
preparedness serves in another role in the facility such as the director of nursing, facilities
manager, activities director, etc.
This study will assess communication strategies facilities utilized for education,
training, and use of preparedness skills. It will also assess degree of adoption of and
compliance with mandated requirements from the state and CMS and, finally, assess degree
of implementation of the voluntary elements of comprehensive planning derived from
lessons learned and best practices of other state plans.
Attributes associated with innovation adoption
Rogers found that five perceived attributes of innovations account for 49-87% of
the variance in the rate of adoption: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity,
trialability and observability (Rogers, 1995).

Relative advantage suggests that the

innovation needs to be clearly better than the process or product it replaces. Its application
to organizational analysis of adoption has been reported by Pankratz, Hallfors and Cho
(2002) as the primary attribute distinguishing organizational decision-making to adopt or
not. An example from Long Term Care (LTC) is clearly illustrative of this key attribute.
The previous minimal standards of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
were replaced by the new recommended CMS “guidelines for long term care emergency
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preparedness” and coincided with the development of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning
and Resource Manual. The advantage of the manual over current CMS requirements is that
it incorporates the best practices from twenty other state plans, LTC facility plans and trade
association recommendations and expands on the CMS guidelines to provide a complete
emergency planning tool for long term care to adopt and implement. Facilities that
implement the manual will meet and exceed CMS recommended standards in a userfriendly, comprehensive format by using the “crosswalk” incorporated in the KY All
Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual

that identifies the CMS recommended

guidelines matched to exact pages in the manual. Relative advantage provides a tangible
benefit that may be quantified, in this case by monies saved by effective mitigation and
preparedness.
Compatibility refers to the degree to which the innovation is compatible with
potential adopters’ experiences, values and needs. And, is it better than the preparedness
long term care used before the innovation of comprehensive planning. (Rogers, 2003;
Greenhalph et al, 2004). Pandey and Yadama’s study of adoption of improved cookstoves
in Nepal (1992) found knowledge about the cookstoves had modest effect compared to the
compatibility with cultural practices.
Referring to the above LTC example, the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and
Resource Manual was specifically designed in collaboration with input from LTC facility
leadership from the two KY state LTC associations. It incorporated their needs and
experiences and is compatible with the values of long term care as opposed to
overemphasizing the values of the incident response network or the militaristic tone so
common to FEMA materials. Initial emergency preparedness manual development was
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drawn from review of over 20 different state, local and agency plans related to long term
care. The best ideas were applied from each plan to reflect the best practices in the field todate. The KY state long term care associations’ input added subjective content that
enhanced the manual’s application to the culture and needs of Kentucky long term care
facilities.
The complexity factor speaks to the ease of use of the innovation. As applied here
to long term care, the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual was written
using language that is meaningful to long term care providers and services. It bridges the
requirements of the FEMA standards derived from the experience of firefighters and the
military to easy and ready application by long term care.
Trialability relates to the degree to which potential adopters can experiment with
and even revise the product or process to meet their unique needs. The KY All Hazards
LTC Planning and Resource Manual can be used in chapters or sections and is in electronic
format so facilities can use any or all of the content to adopt or integrate with an existing
plan. An electronic version of the entire manual in available on the KYEPA website and a
CD was available in the back of the manual so facilities could make use of any or all of the
material.
Observability refers to the tangible and physical evidence of the innovation in use
and its impact. In the case of the KY LTC, it is best illustrated by observations made during
the early training process. It was apparent in training events that include panels of LTC
facility users that non-users responded best to first-hand reports of the benefits of the
innovation from their peers increasing the likelihood they would adopt the innovation.
Active facility users of the manual were incorporated in all of the training events. They
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sat on panels and shared their experience with adoption of the KY All Hazards LTC
Planning and Resource Manual and gave first-hand experience as to how it assisted in their
facility response and recovery in current disasters. These panels of peers provided the
opportunity to observe (observability) how actual adoption and implementation of
comprehensive emergency preparedness can benefit a long term care facility. In the end,
they proved to be the single most persuasive element in increasing the diffusion of
innovation process. In addition, when LTC facilities participated in on-site or regional
disaster exercises, they could observe other LTC and first responders in application of the
same principles/practices.
Factors influencing Diffusion of Innovation
Time is a critical factor in the diffusion of innovations. The diffusion process is
cumulative over time and the decision process within the organization or adoption unit also
varies in time. The degree of knowledge and persuasion preceding the adoption decision
takes time.

Time can also frustrate diffusion of innovations.

In KY, LTC had

opportunities for frequent repetition of the emergency preparedness process through
multiple training offerings each year. Facilities could “try on” the minimal actions required
by regulation or statute until they voluntarily put a comprehensive infrastructure in place.
In theory, different actors in the communication process need time to integrate the
information about the innovation and to communicate their attitudes about it to others or
receive opinions from others. The rate of adoption is measured in time as the organization
adopts, revises and maintains the innovation. Rogers found the distribution of adopters is
cumulative over time and will rise in an S-shape curve. Innovators and early adopters are
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few and the early majority and late majority adopters make up the bulk of the increase with
a slight plateau for laggards (Rogers, 2003).
Communication channels are critical to the innovation diffusion process. The
nature of the communication between two persons about the ease of use and utility of the
innovation can determine whether it gets adopted or rejected as well as the rate of adoption.
The research on diffusion of innovation has found that the decision to adopt is less about
the actual qualities of the product/process and more about subjective assessment by peers
and champions of the innovation. The degree of interpersonal communication that occurs
about the innovation and the types of communication used by change agents can impact
the rate of adoption. Change agents are invested in bringing the innovation to the potential
users. In Kentucky, the KYEPA program has been a change agent, supported by the KY
Department for Public Health and the KY State Survey Agency. Feedback from attendees
of the training workshops reported that attending training with other long term care staff
(especially safety committee staff) made a difference in their degree of enthusiasm to take
the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual back to the facility and begin
using it in their safety committees and management team. The same process was used with
the development of a KY Incident Command System (ICS) training curricula for long term
care so facilities could become certified in ICS levels 100, 200, 700 and 800. Facilities that
attend group training were apt to integrate ICS into their preparedness planning. The
materials were also incorporated into the KY bi-annual Emergency Preparedness for Aging
electronic newsletters as well as in newsletters published by the two state long term care
associations and the KY Office of Inspector General. It is difficult for a LTC facility in
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Kentucky to not be exposed to the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual
and the ICS information by peers and the key organizations that influence their work.
The characteristics of the social system and its norms are important variables in the
rate of innovation adoption. The rate may differ based on differences in the size or location
and norms of potential adopter (Rogers, 2003). Norms may differ between urban long term
care facilities and rural facilities because urban facilities have access to more resources and
expect a ready response. They can be less inclined to collaborate with the HPP regional
health care coalitions. Rural facilities depend on the cooperation of others in the
community as a cultural norm and be more inclined to participate in HPP regional health
care coalitions or be more self-sufficient and less inclined. Prior to the KYEPA program,
inaction was the norm across long term care facilities’ preparedness in Kentucky.
Real change occurs in the social system when ownership of the innovation shifts
from change agent to opinion leaders, i.e. long term care stakeholders and facility
administrators and staff who champion the benefits of adoption to others in the social
system. The dominant change agent is and will continue to be CMS. As their expectations
in the form of regulation has been limited, so has adoption.
Opinion leaders within the social system can have significant influences on the rate
of adoption because they tend to operate within the adopting organization and can influence
decisions due to shared compatibility with organizational norms (Rogers, 2003). In the
case of Kentucky long term care, opinion leaders also include the KY state LTC
associations as they have a major role in the establishment of norms. The degree of
interconnectedness among members of these state associations is very high in Kentucky
and their influence cannot be understated. If they incorporate emergency preparedness in
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conference session topics or provide emphasis by sponsoring specific training, diffusion of
the usefulness of preparedness leads to adoption which can lead to implementation.
Types of Innovation Decisions
There are three types of innovation decisions: optional, collective and authoritybased decisions. Optional decisions are made by an individual independently of the rest of
the organization. In Kentucky’s case, for instance, there were three long term care facility
administrators and one director of nursing, two in the eastern half of the state and two in
the western half, who saw the value of emergency preparedness and how their facility could
benefit from participating on the HPP regional health care coalitions. These champions got
involved in the early days of their coalitions and became leaders in their regions and their
state LTC associations. Their decisions to adopt were made as individuals, not because of
promotion from a state association or emergency response agency. They were able to take
advantage of grant monies early for their facilities and, therefore, be better prepared.
Collective decisions to adopt are based on a consensus decision-making. In some
Kentucky facilities, for example, the consensus was that preparedness beyond minimum
requirements of quarterly fire drills was unnecessary because they would simply take the
residents to the local hospital. Those facilities have learned some hard lessons as they
discovered that the hospitals planned to discharge patients to LTC during an emergency
and, in some cases, refused to receive LTC residents during a life-threatening event. It
became clear that if LTC needed to evacuate to other health care locations, relationships
needed to be established, mutual aid agreements and memoranda of agreements needed to
be developed to integrate LTC needs and resources into the health care provider/responder
mix.
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Authority-based decisions to adopt or reject are decisions made by a few individuals
in an organization based on their position of power or status. Authority figures do not
always view the investment of time and effort of value relative to the effort. And,
emergency preparedness takes effort. In some cases, administrators did embrace the
importance of preparedness and maintained leadership. In other cases, the job was
delegated to environment/maintenance/facility managers. In others, it was delegated to
nursing, dietary, or social services for example.
Stages of the Innovation-Decision Process
Stages of innovation decisions are ultimately about individual and organizational
behavior change. Rogers (2003) asserts that an individual moving from a change in
knowledge about an idea to behavior change is a cumulative process. Different
communication channels impact the rate of change to differing degrees. Knowledge change
is easier to achieve than behavior change.
For Rogers, the knowledge stage involves the potential user gaining knowledge of
the innovation and how it functions. This stage can be impacted by the characteristics of
the organization and the decision-maker, such as education, socioeconomic status,
openness to new ideas, engagement with other like persons both inside and outside the
organization. Next, the individual moves through the persuasion stage as they hear about
the new idea, product/process or behavior from others and develop a positive attitude
stance towards using it. This is the stage where the social system acceptance or rejection
of the innovation frames the individual moving to the decision stage or not. In the decision
stage, the potential adopter intends to explore additional information about the innovation
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and sets the intention to actually put the behavior in place, or “adopt” the behavior. The
decision to accept the innovation or reject it is a product of the decision stage.
The implementation stage occurs when the innovation is actually adopted and put
into place followed by a period of “creating fit” through integrating new learning as the
adopter organization uses the innovation. The confirmation stage occurs when the user
experiences tangible benefit from using the innovation and it becomes integrated into the
organization’s ongoing work. Use of the innovation is absorbed and maintained by the
organization and it no longer feels like a new idea. Change is institutionalized.
Interpersonal communication to others outside of the organization occurs and the
innovation is diffused to other organizations.
Characteristics of Adopters
Rogers devised his categorization of adopter categories when he was a doctoral
student at Iowa State in 1958. His criteria are premised on innovativeness, the “degree to
which an individual or other unit of adoption is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than
other members of a social system” (Rogers, 2000). His research found a normal distribution
curve supported categorization into five categories: innovators (2.5%), early adopters
(13.5%), early majority (34%), late majority (34%) and laggards (16%) (Rogers, 2003).
Innovators are the most willing to be exposed and they can be viewed as outliers
within their social system. Innovators can deal comfortably with the uncertainty of new
ideas and how their use in the system may or may not be accepted. They bring the new idea
to the organization, are open to their failure and still are willing to continue to bring other
new ideas.
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Early adopters are less the outlier and more the voice within the organization/social
system that others look to for use of existing methods and new ways of doing things. Early
adopters may be the opinion leaders and are sought out for input about the innovation. They
may be more interconnected within the organization across management and line staff as
well as outside of the organization with state associations (i.e. state associations of nursing
or long term care). This category of adopter is thought to be better-educated, more
cosmopolitan and even considered to be a community leader (Rogers, 2003).
The early majority may not have status within the organization; however, they hold
a key role in moving the innovation further towards its use. They tend to follow the early
adopters and become positive about the merits of the innovation. They are a linchpin in the
interpersonal communication process about the innovation.
The late majority maintain system norms. Hence, they are not risk takers and are
skeptical of change. Their skepticism needs to be addressed to minimize the risk of them
expending energy sharing a negative opinion of the innovation.

However, they are more

willing to adopt an innovation if the evidence is convincing that the innovation has value.
The laggards are last to adopt an innovation. Their process for innovation adoption
is very lengthy due to their resistance to new ideas (Rogers, 2003).
Diffusion of Innovation theory has been criticized for its “pro-innovation bias” due
to the claims that research often is funded by change agents with a vested interest in the
research outcomes, the retrospective nature of the research, the research evaluates only
innovations that have been successfully adopted and/or the research has only focused
primarily on innovations that spread rapidly. This study is retrospective, does not evaluate
the success of the adoption rather assesses useful pathways to adoption and implementation
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and, in the years between the innovation and the CMS Final Rule, spread of the innovation
has required consistency of diffusion over ten years given the complexity of preparedness
planning and the frequency of LTC staff turnover (Laditka et al, 2006).
Research on application of DOI theory as stated earlier crosses many disciplines.
In a study of adoption of solar water heaters in China (Sereenonchai, Arunrat, Xu , & Yu,
2017) found that the most influential drivers for adoption were social influence, physical
need, innovation attributes, income, communication channels, size, awareness, government
policy and education in that order.
Dearing, Beacom et al., (2017) undertook a study of Canadian long term care
organizations’ diffusion and adoption of resident care best practices. They identified those
sources of advice-giving organizations, groups or individuals most utilized in decisions to
adopt new practices. Results identified that inter-organizational relationships had greater
impact than interpersonal relationships and in many cases the health authorities or subject
matter experts were more influential than expected. Proximity to the opinion leaders
(individuals and organizations) was more important than cross-provincial or national
networks. Social modeling from peers or organizations proved a powerful influence as
well.
The impact of manipulated versus voluntary adoption has been addressed by
Gayadeen and Phillips (2014) in their work on diffusion of community policing
incentivized by federal grants. Results found that diffusion and adoption can be hastened
with financial incentives and political incentives. Initially, KY LTC did not respond to
financial incentives. Awareness of the impact of comprehensive change of CMS and state
regulations in the follow-up studies, may provide diffusion pathways to all category of
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adopters for future adoption lessening the impact of time. The remaining question is how
to identify the degrees of implementation.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Purpose of study
The purpose of this research was twofold. The first was a description of the status
of long term care emergency preparedness based on survey responses from long term care
facilities by analyzing their emergency preparedness plans; emergency training received
by staff; emergency training exercises undertaken in their facility and HPP health care
coalition region; resources outside their facilities they have utilized, and their needs for
additional training. The description was also to provide information on how diffusion of
the innovation occurred-- through preferred training sponsors/providers and identification
of how LTC facilities heard about the best practices as well as suggestions on the different
communication pathways LTC facilities have used to gain information and knowledge
about the innovation.
The second purpose was to identify factors related to the adoption of emergency
planning practices recommended or required for long term care facilities. Specifically, the
focus was to assess implementation of the innovation by tracking the voluntary
implementation of preparedness measures which exceeded existing regulations at the time
of the study. The factors that are suggested are from a widely used analytical model
developed by Everett Rogers and described in his book “Diffusion of Innovations” (Rogers,
2003).

His work has been widely used to analyze factors that influence adoption of

farming practices, medications, new technology, banking practices, and public health
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among others.

In this study, the analysis included: characteristics of long term care

facilities, chief administrators; range of staff with significant knowledge of emergency
planning, relationships with HPP regional health care coalitions, sources of additional
training, participation in local, regional and state emergency exercises; and use of resources
outside the facility.
The research questions explored in this study were:
1. What is the profile of Long Term Care (LTC) facilities participating in
emergency preparedness planning?
2. What is the profile of representatives/leadership of LTC facilities
participating in emergency preparedness planning?
3. In LTC facilities’ emergency preparedness plans, what are the current
planning elements?
4. Are LTC facilities aware of a) recommended best practices and
guidelines and b) what methods of communication and sponsors of
training did they use?
5. Are LTC facilities a) utilizing any of the recommended best practices and
b) CMS guidelines for their emergency preparedness plan and, c) what
specific potential emergencies and disasters are addressed?
6. Are LTC facilities discussing emergency preparedness planning and
coordination with other community organizations?
7. How prepared operationally are LTC facilities to manage a no-notice
emergency or disaster?
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8. How prepared are LTC facilities to manage: a) a no-notice evacuation of
residents from their facility in case of an emergency or disaster? , and b)
to host evacuees from another institution/health care facility?
9. What experience do LTC facilities have with emergency preparedness
training and drills/exercises?
10. Are there any regional/geographic, facility size differences in regards
to emergency preparedness plans? (i.e. elements of plan, specific
potential emergencies and disasters addressed, awareness and
utilization of recommended best practices and guidelines,
engaging community organizations, facility operations, evacuations,
and experiences with training, drills/exercises).
11. Are there any regional/geographic, facility size differences in
emergency preparedness planning in regard to Rogers’ Diffusion
Innovation Theory related to adoption and implementation?
12. What is the overall readiness of KY LTC for a no-notice
emergency event?
Study variables and measures
The study dealt with Kentucky’s long-term care system, particularly facility
personnel who are involved in planning and training facility staff for serious emergency
events. The study attempted to identify the range of personnel who are key participants in
these activities and depth of their participation. It is generally believed that the more types
of staff roles involved in preparedness leadership and the greater their exposure to training
and emergency exercises, the better the plan and more effective the facility will be able to
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respond in emergencies. However, anyone who has worked in a LTC facility realizes there
are many demands on staff time, especially those at the managerial and supervisory level.
What people would like to do and what they can actually do can be much different,
especially when it deals with preparing for events that are sometime in the future and not
as pressing in common day-to-day activities that never seem to end.
At a minimum, an Emergency Preparedness Plan should cover the key areas
required by The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and Kentucky State Statutes.
In addition, best practices go far beyond minimum compliance and these are included in
the Kentucky All Hazards LTC Emergency Planning Manual. The study used the following
items as the most important to track for the quality of facility’s emergency plan, which will
be called Implementation for purposes of this study. Implementation moves beyond
Compliance, in this case we call it adoption, and captures best practices as identified at the
time of the survey including: a facility specific hazard vulnerability analysis, sections that
covered responsibilities and tasks for a wide range of potential hazards, sheltering-in-place,
emergency evacuations and a evacuee surge inflow from evacuating health facilities. It is
generally recommended that an emergency plan should cover these items including what
tasks should be carried out and by whom and who has authority to make what emergency
response decisions. At the time of the survey, any item beyond compliance was voluntary
and marks a facility’s investment of resources in site-specific emergency planning.
The degree of emergency preparedness training was assessed by tracking the
number of different trainings and the range of organizations providing the training. It is
important for a facility’s emergency preparedness leadership to engage in this training
because it is the portal to knowledge about the innovation. It is often the opportunity to
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establish relationships with peers and first responders, learn about the best communication
methods with outside emergency management, and learn about who is responsible for what
in an emergency. Quality of preparedness is based on the generally accepted assumption
that the more types of training team members complete (range), the better the facility plan
and the more prepared a facility will be to deal with serious emergency events.
Information about the numbers and sponsors of exercises that are completed by a
facility was also collected. Some exercises are carried out within the facility emergency
planning team such as the hazard vulnerability analysis.

Others are facilitated and

sponsored by external preparedness and response partners, where a community group
simulates an emergency and “walks” through the completeness of their response relative
to the exercise scenario. Whatever is lacking in the plan is added to the emergency plan.
Team members also may participate in regional (county, multi-county or state areas)
exercises. Exercises related to sheltering-in-place, emergency evacuations, or client surge
inflow usually involve additional staff in a facility. Again, the quality of facility
preparedness is generally believed to be better the more a facility conducts different type
of exercises (range) and makes improvements to their plan.
There are certain factors that are related to the adoption of innovation or new
practices. Some of these are taken from Rogers (2005). Rogers research found that chief
administrators with more education and more involvement with regional, state and national
networks tend to be early adopters and more likely to experiment with new concepts. The
study tested whether their leadership contributes to greater adoption and implementation.
More recent research findings that Rogers has conducted with researchers from academic
management programs also indicates organizations that go through a process of reviewing

44

new information and adapting it to their specific organizations are much more likely to
adopt and retain new practices. Their work indicates that this organizational review process
by a group of facility team members is very important to the adoption process. There are a
few questions about this in the survey instrument specifically about adoption of the KY All
Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual and the estimated percentage of adoption of
the manual at the time of the survey.
Experience with the emergency preparedness and response network indicates that
any facility that wants to develop an effective response to emergencies must be aware of
the local emergency managers and how they can assist in different emergencies as well as
how they can help facilities plan and train for emergencies, particularly those facilities
vulnerable to significant hazards. This is related to another area covered in the survey.
Respondents are queried in several places if they have established relationships with
emergency managers and other sources during emergencies, preparing emergency plans,
facilitating a wide variety of training as well as on-site, local, regional and statewide
exercises. This engagement with partners adds to the depth of a plan, effective response
during an event and enhanced life safety of residents.
The survey was based on earlier work done by Eiring, Blake and Howard, (2012)
and incorporated elements of the KY Hospital Preparedness Program.
Illustration 3.1 lists items in the order they are covered in the survey:
Facility Profile
# of residents in each service (licensed bed size)
Location and type of community (urban/rural, eastern/western region);
Type of ownership (for-profit vs. non-profit/governmental)
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Respondent Profile
Years working (overall experience in LTC, position experience & stability in
same organization, same position)
Network organizations (local, state, national)
Network contacts (state, regional, local)
# Emergency preparedness meetings in 5 years
Facility Emergency Experience
Prior experience with evacuation
Prior experience with medical surge
Disaster Plan
Awareness of KY All Hazards LTC Emergency Preparedness Manual
Used any of it/how much it
Completed Hazard Vulnerability Analysis
Identified types
Developed emergency plan to degree of hazard risks
Community contacts/procedures covered in plan
Have on-site generator (type of fuel & more for emergency fuel)
Training in Emergency Preparedness
Emergency Preparedness Team role (job title)
HPP Regional health care coalition training experiences
Training needs
Type needed, if any
Work with County Emergency Manager/Preparedness Partners
Completed Mutual Aid agreements and MOU/MOAs with the HPP regional
health care coalition, its members, and/or other LTC
Communication with key groups
Evacuation sites and transportation resources
Sample selection
Sample selection reflected the ongoing challenge of ensuring reasonable response
rates from LTC facilities through both electronic and direct mail communication. Nursing
facilities in Kentucky at least have been a challenge as a group to respond to direct mail or
electronic mail. In the early days of the KY Emergency Preparedness for Aging & LTC
Program, a LTC administrator offered what turned into good advice, “we do not take calls,
open mail or e-mail unless we know the person”. As a result, the KY Emergency
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Preparedness for Aging & LTC program made extensive efforts to establish relationships
such that, if an e-mail was sent, it received a response in the program’s role as first
responder for LTC to the KY Department for Public Health.
The survey sample used a purposive method identifying the LTC facilities likely to
have had exposure to preparedness planning and be knowledgeable about their facility’s
plan. Sign-in sheets from previous trainings, meetings or exercises facilitated by
preparedness partners were used to collect contact information. An e-mail was sent in
advance to let the recipient know to expect an invitation to participate in the survey. Finally,
a letter of invitation was sent by e-mail announcing the survey with the link to the Qualtrics
site to complete the survey.
Data collection
Ninety-one nursing facilities out of 284 were sent invitations through e-mail with
links to the survey on Qualtrics and a separate consent form. Multiple invitees within LTC
facilities were sent e-mails due to employee turnover rates in LTC facilities. Follow-up
requests to participate were e-mailed at six weeks, eight weeks and ten weeks after the
initial request. The invitation requested that the survey be completed by the person with
the most knowledge in the facility about its emergency plan.
Consent Procedures
The study used a Preamble consent which was included in the link to the
survey on Qualtrics as a separate form with a forced response of yes or no. All
respondents indicated they accepted the consent prior to their inclusion in the sample.
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RESULTS
Response rate
Ninety-one long term care facilities were sent the survey questionnaire. Responses
were received from 69 facilities (75.82% return rate). Data cleaning involved eliminating
multiple respondents from the same facility, duplicate responses from the same
respondent, and incomplete surveys (i.e. where respondents simply completed the facility
name or their years of experience). Ultimately, the final sample of 50 LTC facilities
was used for all analyses (54.94% of the 91 facilities that were sent surveys; 72.46% of
the 69 facilities that returned surveys). Sample sizes were compared to state data for
region, geography and bed size with results indicating representativeness to LTC
facilities across the state. Type of ownership was not compared due to lack of access
to state data on this particular variable.
Data analysis approach
There was two parts to the analysis. The first part used descriptive analysis to
assess representativeness of survey responses to all long term care facilities. Long
term care facilities were collapsed into regions (East/West), urban and rural
locations, bed size, ownership type and respondent job title and responding facilities
were grouped in similar manner. In addition, the descriptive analysis also identified the
communication methods used by LTC facilities to gain knowledge about diffusion
innovation.

The second part of the analysis consisted of using inferential statistics to

identify factors related to the adoption and implementation of emergency management
practices.
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Response to research questions
Q1:

What is the profile of Long Term Care (LTC) facilities participating in
emergency preparedness planning?
Kentucky is primarily a rural state with four Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area

located in the Louisville-Jefferson County, Lexington, Paducah-Mayfield, and seven
counties in Northern Kentucky. The geographic representations have been collapsed
further into Eastern and Western regions with Louisville and Western Kentucky making
up the Western portion and the Eastern region comprised of Lexington/Northern/Eastern
Kentucky making up the East region. As can be seen in Table 2, sixty-eight percent (n=34)
of the respondents were from facilities located in the western half of Kentucky and the
other twenty-eight percent (n=16) were from facilities located in eastern part of Kentucky
(see map). Fifty percent (n=25) of the facilities were located in urban counties and the other
fifty percent (n=25) were in rural counties. Facility bed size ranged from under-50 beds
(12.0%), 50 to 99 beds (50%), 100 to 149 beds (32%), and over-150 beds (4%). Sixty-two
percent (n=31) of the facilities’ bed sizes ranged from 1-99 while only 36% (n=18) of the
facilities’ bed size was 100 or more beds. Lastly, the majority of the facilities (62.0%,
n=31) were for-profit institutions of long term care.
These categorical comparisons reflect equivalence to KY LTC except for east
(n=16) versus west (n=34) because of the difference in sample size. The western facilities
include a sampling bias due to the disproportionate representation by Louisville-based
facilities (22%); however, this bias provided an equal percentage of urban and rural LTC
in the sample.
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Table 2: Profile of Sample Characteristics
Facility Characteristics

N

%

6

12.0%

50-99 beds

25

50.0%

100-149 beds

16

32.0%

2

4.0%

1-99 beds

31

62.0%

100+ beds

18

36.0%

East

16

32.0%

West

34

68.0%

Urban

25

50.0%

Rural

25

50.0%

For Profit

31

62.0%

Non-Profit and Governmental

19

38.0%

Bed Size
<50 beds

150+ beds
Bed Size Collapsed

KY Region

Geography

Ownership
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Q2:

What is the profile of representatives/leadership of Long Term Care (LTC)
facilities participating in emergency prepredness planning?
Long Term Care (LTC) facility administrators were asked to select the person with

the greatest knowledge of the facility’s preparedness to complete the survey. In practice,
the administrator very often appoints another manager to chair the “safety” committee or
“preparedness” committee. Typically, those appointed are managers who attended
trainings and HPP regional health care coalition meetings and/or LTC subcommittee
meetings represented all areas of responsibility within the facility. The managers
participating and completing the survey were administrators/ assistant administrators (
44%, n =22), director of nursing (10%, n=5), facility manager (14%, n=7) and other (30%,
n= 15) which included assistant director of nursing (2.0%), corporate representative
(2.0%), executive assistant ( 2.0%), human resources (4.0%), risk management (2.0%) and
social services (2.0%).
Facility managers had been in their current position on average the longest
(mean=9.09 years, SD = 6.07) and the Director of Nursing the fewest number of years
(mean =5.25, SD = 2.82); although not surprisingly, administrators/assistant administrators
had been working in the long term care industry on average more than twice the amount of
time (years) of other categories of managers participating in emergency preparedness
planning. It bears exploration to examine differences between facility manager and
administrator scores for implementation. Administrators have ultimate responsibility for
compliance items as there are monetary sanctions attached while voluntary elements can
be naturally championed by other managers.

51

Table 3: Respondents’ Characteristics

Administrator/Assistant Administrator
Years in LTC *
Years in the LTCF**
Years in Current Position
Director of Nursing
Years in LTC
Years in the LTCF
Years in Current Position
Facilities Manager
Years in LTC
Years in the LTCF
Years in Current Position
Other
Years in LTC
Years in the LTCF
Years in Current Position

N

%

22

44.0%

5

7

15

10.0%

14.0%

30.0%

Mean

SD=

25.14
12.34
8.21

9.29
9.57
8.10

10.08
6.58
5.25

5.80
4.67
2.82

11.95
10.09
9.09

6.50
5.71
6.07

12.66
7.72
5.51

10.00
4.35
2.96

* LTC = Long Term Care
**LTCF = Long Term Care Facility

Q3: What are the current elements in LTC facilities’ emergency preparedness
plans?
In 2014, there were very few specific emergency preparedness-related federal or
state regulations. The emergency events that were addressed by federal and state regulation
pertained to fire, power outage, and sheltering-in-place needs for a minimum of 2-3 days
(KY). Specifically, required elements for LTC facilities in 2014 included: a written fire
response plan incorporating quarterly fire drills; sprinkler systems; emergency doors and
lighting. The “mandated” emergency plan had few details and required the facilities have
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a back-up generator capable of powering emergency lighting in hallways and the “red”
outlets in each room. These outlets carry electric current in emergency situations for items
such as oxygen, ventilators, etc. Additionally, an evacuation plan to an alternate care site
was required and plans that addressed response during power outages and water
emergencies.
Kentucky regulations are greater than many other states and fewer than the coastal,
hurricane-vulnerable states. Kentucky’s requirements include: staffing plans in the event
of an emergency, identification of individual resident needs during an emergency, a system
to contact staff in the event of an emergency requiring additional staff, surplus emergency
supplies for at least 2-3 days, back-up power with fuel for a minimum number of days,
medications sufficient to meet the resident needs, and records of all training attended by
staff to be kept up-to-date and on the premises. The following table displays the current
elements reported by respondents representing long term care facilities across the state of
Kentucky.
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Table 4. Current Elements in LTC Facilities’ Emergency Preparedness Plan

Does your facility have a comprehensive emergency preparedness plan?

N
%
46 92.0%

Does your facility have an evacuation plan to an alternate care site?

37 74.0%

Does your facility have a communication plan in place for disasters?

46 92.0%

Transportation contracts in the event of an evacuation

28 56.0%

Have a system to communicate with staff during an emergency

46 92.0%

Have a central place to capture characteristics and needs of residents

34 68.0%

Water for 2-3 days

46 92.0%

Food 2-3 days

47 94.0%

Does your facility have an on-site emergency generator?

47 94.0%

Generator covers air conditioning

28 56.0%

Generator covers heat

33 66.0%

Generator covers emergency lighting

47 94.0%

Generator covers critical care of residents

42 84.0%

Generator fuel supply 2-3+ days

31 62.0%

Contract with fuel vendor

36 72.0%
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Nearly all of the respondents (92%) reported that their facility had a comprehensive
emergency preparedness plan, including having food (94%) and water (94%) for 2-3 days,
an onsite emergency generator (94%) which covers emergency lighting (94%).

These

items are among the required elements for preparedness and resident care by both federal
and state regulations. Fewer respondents (56%) reported voluntary measures such as
existing transportation contracts in the event of an evacuation or generator supported air
conditioning (56%) as part of their emergency preparedness plans and contracts with fuel
vendors (72%). The hurricane experience in Florida in the summer of 2018 pointed out the
critical nature of these items as residents died as a result of no air conditioning and/or
inadequate transportation planning.
Q4:

Are LTC facilities aware of a) recommended best practices and guidelines?
and b) how did they become aware?
At the time of the survey, there were only minimal requirements to be included in

an emergency plan. Minimum best practices include those items in current CMS Life
Safety and Preparedness regulations. Little is spelled out with specificity for what defines
preparedness within these regulations. The arbitrary nature of the regulations leave LTC to
fill in the blanks on their own.
In order to develop a comprehensive emergency plan, LTC had to find state and
corporate plans or attend training provided by the state associations. The KY All Hazards
LTC Emergency Planning and Resource Manual incorporated guidance and practices
from over twenty state plans, county plans and individual facility plans from across the
country. This manual was designated as the “best practice” for long term care preparedness
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by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) of the
Department for Health and Human Services (DHHS).
In addition, the Office of Inspector General of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid funded a study following the hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2007) that identified
gaps in preparedness planning for and implementation of preparedness and response plans.
A follow-up study (2010) was also funded and found fewer facilities followed their plans
or had effective plans than the 2007 study. CMS issued “recommended guidelines” for
preparedness planning in 2007 after the initial report and revised them in 2010. These
guidelines were voluntary and added items to best practices that had never been considered.
The KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual covered three major
preparedness categories and responses represented facility use of each category: 1) hazard
vulnerability and response templates based on each of 17 hazards (60.0%), 2) facility
operations (60.0%) and, 3) employee personal readiness (52.0%). Additionally, the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services issued Recommended Guidelines for Emergency
Preparedness. The guidelines represented an expanded list of practices for emergency
preparedness. CMS issued a set of voluntary guidelines to mitigate the impact of severe
hazards to life safety as organized in five over-arching topics.
Awareness of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual was
positively reported by forty-two of fifty respondents (84.0%), and the primary method of
education about the manual was through training provided by the KY Emergency
Preparedness for Aging & LTC Program (54%) followed by the state LTC associations
(28%), the HPP regional health care coalitions (22%) and the KY OIG (8%). Surprisingly,
respondents did not become aware of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource
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Manual from peers (8%) rather from change agents. This is a departure from Rogers’
definition of diffusion which views communication among peers as the most powerful
means of spreading an innovation. Awareness of the CMS recommended guidelines was
reported by 96% (N=48) of respondents but there was not a specific survey question to be
able to cite the source of their knowledge. The recommendations were included in the KY
All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual accompanied by a crosswalk for staff to
find the planning tools for each recommended item.
Q5: Are LTC facilities a) utilizing any of the recommended best practices and b)
guidelines for their emergency preparedness plan and, c) what specific potential
emergencies and disasters are addressed?
Best practices included in the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual
and the CMS recommended guidelines were captured by the survey. In response to the
survey question as to whether facilities adopted any or all of the KY All Hazards LTC
Planning and Resource Manual, 70.0% (n=35) of respondents reported some degree of
adoption. The survey question related to the percent of adoption of the manual found 24.0%
had no adoption of the manual with 62.0% reported varying degrees of adoption.
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Table 5a : Best Practices Facility has in Place:
N

%

A comprehensive emergency preparedness plan

46

92.0%

An evacuation plan to an alternate care site

37

74.0%

A communication plan in place for disasters

46

92.0%

Transportation contracts in the event of an evacuation

28

56.0%

A system to communicate with staff during an emergency

46

92.0%

A central place to capture characteristics and needs of residents

34

68.0%

Emergency water supply for 2-3 days

46

92.0%

Emergency food supply for 2-3 days

47

94.0%

An on-site emergency generator

47

94.0%

A generator that covers air conditioning

28

56.0%

A generator that covers heat

33

66.0%

A generator that covers emergency lighting

47

94.0%

A generator that covers critical care of residents

42

84.0%

Emergency generator fuel supply 2-3+ days

31

62.0%

Contract with emergency fuel vendor

36

72.0%

Use of the CMS guidelines are represented in Table 5b below. Awareness of
facility personnel contact, emergency manager contact and facility organization structure
are high, from 84% -92%. In other words, facility organizational knowledge is high;
however, the care of residents and safety of the building are substantially lower at 66% -
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68%, respectively. This becomes especially problematic in a disaster or an emergency and
identifies a significant gap in preparedness.

Table 5b: LTC Adoption of CMS Recommended Guidelines
N

%

Facility Personnel

46

92.0%

Characteristics and Needs of Residents

34

68.0%

Emergency Manager Contact Information

44

88.0%

Facility Organization Chart

42

84.0%

Building Construction and Life Safety Systems

33

66.0%

In addition, critical best practices for any organization’s emergency preparedness
is the Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA). The HVA assesses an organization, or in this
case, nursing homes’ exposure to the most likely hazards so emergency plans can be
developed based on the most significant risk both on scale of the risk and scope of the
impact on the residents, staff and the building and critical systems. The HVA, however, is
not a required element at the time of this study.
The KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual includes seventeen types
of hazards representing the most common hazards for Kentucky with planning templates
for each hazard. A total of forty out of forty-seven respondents responded in the affirmative
(85.1%, SD= 3.58) that they had completed an HVA. Survey respondents further identified
a mean number of eleven hazards out of a possible seventeen hazards their facilities could
have incorporated into their plans. The top three ranked templates were Resident
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Elopement (97.1%), Tornado (97.1%) and Bomb Threat (91.3%). Two-thirds of
responding facilities had identified thirteen different hazards to address in their plans. It is
interesting that the preparedness for a bomb threat (91.3%) is greater than an extended
power outage (84.1%). The power outage is an event that can occur during normal weather
conditions or during a true disaster and provide a greater threat to facilities and resident
safety. There may also be a factor that the LTC with natural gas-fired generators (18.0%)
may not be impacted during an extended outage since they have a continuous source of
back-up power.

60

Table 5c. Disasters Addressed by the Facility Preparedness Plan
N

%

Resident Elopement

67

97.1%

Tornado

67

97.1%

Bomb Threat

63

91.3%

Severe Thunder Storm

62

89.9%

Earthquake

59

85.5%

Extended Power Outage

58

84.1%

Water Shortage

58

84.1%

Winter Storms

57

82.6%

Hazardous Materials

53

76.8%

Ice Storms

52

75.4%

Pandemic Influenza

50

72.5%

Extreme Temperatures

48

69.6%

Flooding

46

66.7%

Hurricane

16

23.2%

Other Disease Outbreak (e.g. SARS)

14

20.3%

Sink Holes

9

13.0%

Wildfire

9

13.0%

61

Q6:

Are LTC facilities discussing emergency preparedness planning and
coordination with other community organizations?
The

survey

asked

respondents

to

select

from

a

list

of

eighteen

organizations/community partners with whom they had discussed emergency
preparedness. This question addresses the active implementation of innovation as users
have reached out to external sources, partnership activities and collaboration with others in
their communities. The mean number of outside preparedness partners reported was 6.67
(SD=4.30), a relatively high number given the time and effort required to become part of
a local, regional and/or state effort. The range of partners includes the following:
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Table 6: Discussed Emergency Preparedness with Community Partners
N=

%

Fire Department

34

68.0%

County Emergency Manager

34

68.0%

Local Hospitals

29

58.0%

Police

27

54.0%

Local Health Department

25

50.0%

Coalition

18

36.0%

KY Emergency Preparedness for Aging & LTC Program

18

36.0%

KY Emergency Management

16

32.0%

KY Department for Public Health

14

28.0%

County Emergency Operations Center

14

28.0%

Utility Company

14

28.0%

KY LTC Ombudsman Program

12

24.0%

Office of Inspector General

11

22.0%

American Red Cross

11

22.0%

State LTC Association

11

22.0%

State Emergency Operations Center

6

12.0%

Hospice Organizations

6

12.0%

National LTC Association

3

6.0%

Hospital Preparedness Program Regional Health Care
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Responses to this question reflect the preference to partner with local first responders and
hospitals followed by regional partners and, lastly, state level responders.

Q7:

How prepared operationally are LTC facilities to manage an emergency or
disaster?
Operational preparedness addresses the infrastructure of the facility, basic

operations to manage facility critical operations for resident care and, as the hurricanes
have made apparent this fall, the ability to sustain the safety of the building, residents and
staff. Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP) is another best practice from the CMS
recommended guidelines. It covers the procedures necessary for LTC to operate in an
emergency situation, whether they are sheltering in the facility, an alternate care site due
to evacuation or are severely short-staffed due to pandemic outbreak. Elements of a COOP
plan include staffing plans in an emergency, financial systems, IT and record-keeping,
electronic health records, medications, sufficient supplies of food, water, medications, the
delivery of needed services for residents onsite or off-site, power and shelter-in-place with
enough supplies to be self-sufficient for a minimum of 2-3 days.
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Table 7: Facility Operations
N

%

Back-up Generator Fuel Type*
Diesel
Propane
Natural Gas
Other

28
7
9
3

56.0%
14.0%
18.0%
6.0%

Current # Hours of Fuel in a Power Outage
24 – 47*
48-71
72 - 96
120 - 250
Unlimited

4
5
12
7
7

8.0%
10.0%
24.0%
14.0%
14.0%

Additional Fuel Contracts
Have contract
Supplier outside of 50 miles

36
6

72.0%
12.0%

Days able to shelter-in-place during a power outage
Two – Three*
Four – Six
Seven – Ten
More than Ten

23
5
14
4

46.0%
10.0%
28.0%
8.0%

Functions Relying on Generator Power
Resident critical care functions (such as oxygen)*
Emergency lighting*
Heat
Laundry facilities
Air Conditioning
Refrigeration
Cooking Elements
Elevators
Monitoring/Security systems (e.g., WanderGuard®)
Other

42
47
33
13
28
38
28
15
35
3

84.0%
94.0%
66.0%
26.0%
56.0%
76.0%
56.0%
30.0%
70.0%
6.0%

Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)

23

46.0%

The data followed by an asterisk reflect the compliance with regulatory standards. Yet, in
an emergency, the lack of voluntary planning suggests heightened risk for KY should a
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true no-notice disaster occur. The facility operational items listed are critical for shelteringin-place particularly in a protracted catastrophic or near-catastrophic disaster situation such
as a tornado or earthquake. Over 80% of respondent facilities exceeded the minimum
number of days of back-up fuel and 54% can shelter in place during a power outage in
excess of the 2-3 day minimum. Thirty-six percent (36%) indicated they could shelter-inplace for an extended period of time. The analysis of what facility functions are hooked up
to the generator included heat and air conditioning. These functions have the biggest impact
on maintaining resident quality of care and put residents at risk for dehydration and other
life-threatening conditions. The hurricane Irma experience in Florida is a glaring example
of the risks to life and litigation against a LTC facility caused by loss of heat and air
conditioning. One LTC facility in western Kentucky had a similar experience in 2009 with
the ice storm when no assistance was available from responders to provide assistance with
a back-up generator and two residents died from the physical stress from loss of heat.
Q8:

How prepared are LTC facilities to manage a) an evacuation of residents
from their facility in case of an emergency or disaster and b) to host evacuees
from another institution/health care facility?
The elements in preparedness for evacuation involve a number of steps in the

development of an effective plan. The first step is to have policies and procedures in place
for decision-making as to when to call for an evacuation compared to sheltering-in-place.
Once resident life and safety are at risk or the infrastructure is damaged to the point that
critical facility functions cannot be maintained, identification of who has authority to make
the most difficult call any administrator can make takes place. Once that is decided, the
next step is to call on the locations identified as alternate care sites, using established
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Mutual Aid agreements and/or MOA/MOUs. As available beds are sought, the next step is
to contact the county emergency manager and transportation providers under contract for
evacuations. It is very helpful to have at least one transportation vendor located beyond
fifty (50) miles in the event all transportation providers in the immediate vicinity are
already committed to other facilities. Hurricane Katrina taught providers that the scale of
the disaster may be so great, the availability of resources may require areas beyond the
impact areas (Hyer, K., Polvika-West, L. & Brown, L. 2008).
An evacuation readiness index was developed to capture the facility readiness for
evacuation. The following items were included in the index:


Arrangements to evacuate to alternate care sites (ACS)



Presence of Mutual Aid Agreements and/or MOA/MOUs



Developed a previous connection with the County Emergency Manager
about preparedness prior to a surge situation



Presence of transportation agreements with providers during an evacuation



Presence of a transportation agreement beyond 50 miles

A composite evacuation readiness index score was calculated by summing all
identified indicators of evacuation (1=yes, 0=no) resulting in possible index scores ranging
from 0-14. Actual scores ranged from 0 to 14 with the mean score of 6.6 and
(SD=3.09) and 7.00 median score. T-tests were run against the independent variables and
no significant differences were found. While no significant differences were found, one
can observe the difference in scores between urban and rural respondents with the rural
communities have fewer options for transportation and convenient transfer of residents to
other LTC facilities and evacuation planning may be the difference between life and death.
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Be that as it may, scores for all categories indicate the need for better planning, and
additional training and exercises.

Table 8: Comparison of Evacuation Readiness Index Scores by
Selected Independent Variables
N

%

Mean

SD=

Bed Size
Small-Medium
Large

31
18

62.0%
36.0%

6.87
6.39

3.442
2.52

.518

46

.607

Ownership
For-profit
Non-profit/Governmental

31
19

62.0%
38.0%

6.48
6.95

2.669
3.749

-.510

47

.612

Region
East
West

16
34

32.0%
68.0%

6.63
6.68

2.335
3.426

-.054

47

.957

Geography
Urban
Rural

25
25

50.0%
50.0%

6.08
7.24

2.999
3.139

-.1.336

47

.188

Job Title (Collapsed)
Senior Management
Other Management

27
22

54.0%
44.0%

6.33
7.05

2.760
3.552

-.790

47

.433

t=

df

p=

LTC may be called upon to receive evacuated residents from a damaged facility or
a hospital in a major disaster in a so called “medical surge”. Plans that facilitate effective
surge in the midst of an emergency is the presence of Mutual Aid agreements and
MOA/MOUs, pre-arrangements related to reimbursement for services provided to
evacuating residents at the receiving site and a process to identify available beds and report
them to the sending facility. Over half of the facilities (54%, n=27) had a surge plan to
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host evacuees from another healthcare facility, but only a few facilities had ever hosted
evacuees from other LTC experiencing an emergency (12%, n=6) or had reimbursement
plans in place if faced with a medical surge (16%, n=8). This is important because
reimbursement to the receiving facility is based on the funding source of the bed in the
sending facility. Therefore, if a private pay facility receives and cares for a Medicaid bed
resident, the receiving site will only be reimbursed at the Medicaid rate. A similar situation
exists between a Medicaid bed and a Medicare-paid bed with reimbursement higher for the
Medicare bed resident.

Q9:

What experience do LTC facilities have with emergency preparedness
training and drills/exercises?
Over the years, Kentucky LTC have had access to a wide range of training from

state emergency management, local emergency managers, HPP regional health care
coalitions, the KY Emergency Preparedness for Aging & LTC Program, state LTC
associations, national conferences and others. These same groups also sponsored local,
regional and statewide emergency exercises testing communication planning, evacuation
plans, surge plans among other types of exercises. These efforts by the sponsors and the
LTC facilities that participated in them established networks of responders and LTC and
preparedness partners leading to more effective skills and improved emergency plans. The
following chart represents the sponsors of trainings and the same list for organizations
sponsoring exercises. The mean number of trainings attended by respondents was 3.49
(SD=3.042) and the mean number of exercises in which they participated is 3.03
(SD=2.939).
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Table 9: LTC Experience with Training and Exercises
# Trainings
Training Sponsors
N
%
1
2.7%

Types of Sponsors
Corporate Office
County Emergency Management

# Exercises
Exercise Sponsors
N
%
4
10.8%

11

29.7%

17

45.9%

County Emergency Operations Center

7

18.9%

12

32.4%

Emergency Medical Services

0

0.0%

9

24.3%

Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)

8

21.6%

8

21.6%

Fire Department

7

18.9%

1

2.7%

17

45.9%

22

54.5%

KY Dept. for Homeland Security

2

5.4%

6

16.2%

KY Dept. for Public Health

6

16.2%

1

2.7%

18

48.6%

7

18.9%

Local Health Department

8

21.6%

3

8.1%

Police Department

4

10.8%

6

16.2%

Red Cross

4

10.8%

12

32.4%

HPP Regional Health Care Coalition

19

51.4%

6

16.2%

State Emergency Operations Center

5

13.5%

13

35.1%

10

27.0%

7

18.9%

2

5.4%

11

29.7%

KY Emergency Management (KYEM)

KY Emergency Preparedness for
Aging & LTC Program

State LTC Association
Other
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The analysis found that the training sponsors are not necessarily the sponsors of
emergency exercises. There is a clear preference of training sponsors from the HPP
regional health care coalitions (51.4%) followed by the KYEPA (48.6%) and KY Division
of Emergency Management (45.9%). Responses to exercise opportunities were led by the
KY Division of Emergency Management (54.5%), County Emergency Management
(45.9%), KY Emergency Operations Center (35.1%), County Emergency Operations
Centers (32.4%) and the Red Cross (32.4%). The results related to exercises are somewhat
puzzling given the exposure to training that respondents received from HPP health care
regional coalitions yet LTC has not participated much with regional exercises. It may
suggest that the HPP regional health care coalition trainings LTC attended were KYEPA
trainings facilitated as part of the HPP regional health care coalition meetings. In actuality,
KYEPA provided the trainings and supported HPP regional health care coalition exercises.
Perhaps HPP regional health care coalition exercises have not integrated LTC content
sufficiently to warrant their time and effort. Anecdotal evidence suggests that HPP regional
health care coalitions over-focus on hospital exercise requirements and do not fully support
LTC participation.
Q10: Are there any regional/geographic, facility size differences in regards to
emergency preparedness plans? (i.e. elements of plan, specific potential
emergencies and disasters addressed, awareness and utilization of
recommended best practices and guidelines, engaging community
organizations, facility operations, evacuations, and experiences with training,
drills/exercises).
T-tests were performed to explore whether there are significant differences between
elements of emergency plans to the independent variables. Plan elements utilized in the
analysis included a) three overarching operational elements of the plan found in the KY
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All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual, b) the number of HVA templates
incorporated in their plans, c) the number of CMS recommended guidelines adopted, d)
number of community preparedness partners, e) number of types of training attended by
respondent, f) number of exercises and exercise sponsors, g) number of transportation
contracts, h)number of evacuation sites, and i) the number of outside preparedness
meetings attended in the past two years.
Significant differences were found between job titles categorized as senior
management and “other” management and the number of HVA templates, number of
community partners and number of exercise sponsors with “other” management scores
higher than senior management respondents. A significant difference was found between
the eastern and western regions on the number of CMS guideline categories. Differences
in ownership type were significant for the number of meetings attended with nonprofit/governmental strikingly greater than for-profit. Geographic differences between
urban and rural locations were the most consistently significant for the number of CMS
guidelines adopted, number of community partners, and the different numbers of exercise
sponsors.

Rural locations reported higher use of HVA templates, more partners,

guidelines, and more exercise sponsors.
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Table 10: Mean Differences Across Emergency Plans

10.58

-1.905

0.679

28

47

0.067

0.501

p=

11.29

1.93

0.286

df

0.367

2.57

34

t=

46

0.190

-1.083

Ownership
ForNonProfit
Profit

0.912
33

4.33

p=

10.44
1.337

4.17

df

11.42
2.00

0.061

t=

# HVA Templates
2.46

43

Bed Size
SmallLarge
Medium

# KY Manual Operating
Sections
1.921

0.797

3.88

28

0.300

4.45

-0.260

25

0.141

Adopted # CMS Guidelines

4.31

-1.057

42

0.591

0.232
3.04

4.61

-1.500

44

0.052

34
0.797

4.00

3.63

-0.541

34

-1.216
34

0.380

2.57

2.77

2.009

7.88
0.260

43

0.411

1.83

16.77

5.93

3.31

-0.887

33

0.742

11.52

0.731

3.58

4.59

0.832

28

0.374

41

# Types Trainings
4.10

2.50

-0.333

34

0.346

# Exercises Attended

3.38

2.33

-0.901

7.00

# Exercise Sponsors

2.16

15.47

6.52

# Transportation Contracts

11.77

# Community Partners

# Preparedness Meetings
Attended
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Table 10: Mean Differences Across Emergency Plans

# HVA Templates
2.29

11.38

4.03

2.35

10.86

-0.191

2.024

-186

.478

34

42

44

34

47

0.305

0.538

0.849

0.049

0.854

0.635

1.94

3.96

2.18

5.25

3.81

2.06

10.16

2.75

4.05

4.50

4.60

7.80

4.60

2.58

11.88

0.266

-2.288

-2.308

-1.038

-2.601

-2.049

-2.939

-1.675

-1.735

35

28

34

44

34

42

44

34

47

0.792

0.030

0.027

0.305

0.014

0.047

0.005

0.103

0.089

p=

# KY Manual Operating
Sections
4.63
6.76

0.622

44.000

0.402

1.67

12.79

df

Adopted # CMS Guidelines
6.50

3.23

-1.038

34

0.777

13.84

t=

# Community Partners
3.87

4.23

-0.848

28

0.792

Geography
Urban
Rural

# Types Trainings
4.25

3.35

-0.286

35

p=

# Exercises Attended

2.50

2.27

0.266

df

# Exercise Sponsors

2.11

11.88

t=

# Transportation Contracts

15.79

Region
East
West

# Preparedness Meetings
Attended

74

Table 10: Mean Differences Across Emergency Plans

t=

46

0.108

0.055

0.291

p=

Other
Mgt.
-1.965

33

33

0.379

df

Mgt.
12.09

-1.652

0.659

Job Title
Senior

10.11
2.67

43

-1.072

43

0.022

# HVA Templates
2.67

0.444

4.20

-0.889

33

0.079

2.14
4.19

0.048

3.10

4.55

-2.404

28

0.959

# KY Manual Operating
Sections
4.19

41

# Types Trainings
4.08

4.40

-1.82

35

4.32

-2.038

# Exercises Attended

2.14

2.71

-0.052

Adopted # CMS Guidelines

8.15

# Exercise Sponsors

1.82

13.44

5.58

# Transportation Contracts

13.23

# Community Partners

# Preparedness Meetings
Attended
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Q. 11: Are there any regional/geographic, facility size differences in regard to
emergency preparedness plans in regards to a) Adoption and b) Implementation of
the plan as defined by Rogers’ Diffusion Innovation Theory?
Adoption Scale
A composite adoption index scale was calculated by summing all identified
indicators of compliance (1=yes, 0=no) resulting in possible index scores ranging from 015. Actual scores produced a mean score of 13.38 (SD=3.907), a fairly high score given
that there were respondents with little adoption of compliance elements. The median score
was 14.0 suggesting that half of responding organizations reported meeting adoption
(compliance) requirements of preparedness. In this analysis, there were significant
differences between east and western region mean scores. The difference in sample size
could be a contributor as there are more early adopters in the east sample and that is where
the initial adoption from LTC was the greatest.
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Table 11a: Adoption Scale:
Means Comparison between Adoption Scale and Independent Variables
N

%

Bed Size
Small-Medium
Large

31
18

63.3%
36.7%

Ownership
For-profit
Non-profit/Governmental

31
19

Region
East
West

Mean

SD=

t=

df

p=

13.33
13.61

3.876
4.132

-.245

46

.807

62.0%
38.0%

13.81
12.68

3.978
3.788

.986

47

.329

16
34

32.0%
68.0%

14.94
12.65

2.909
4.133

1.992

47

.052

Geography
Urban
Rural

25
25

50.0%
50.0%

12.84
13.92

4.478
3.239

-.977

47

.333

Job Title (Collapsed)
Senior Management
Other Management

27
22

55.1%
44.9%

13.37
13.41

3.607
4.415

-.034

46

.973

Implementation Index Scale
Implementation in the Rogers’ model occurs when the user, in this case a LTC facility,
takes the innovation, emergency preparedness, and makes it their own by altering a model
to fit the uses of the adopter. Implementation is a step beyond adoption whereby actual
operationalization of the model is specific to the user, for instance taking voluntary
measures beyond compliance. A composite implementation index scale was developed
by incorporating actual elements that are named, identified and specific to steps towards
preparedness. The implementation index incorporates the selection of steps based on the
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CMS guidelines and best practices exclusive of those required (compliance) as well as
critical elements based on best practices from the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and
Resource Manual.

The Implementation scale incorporates preparedness elements

including:


Facility awareness of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual ,



Percentage range of adoption of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource
Manual,



A Continuity of Operations Plan has been completed,



At least one of three CMS recommended guidelines have been adopted,



Facility can identify more than one transportation vendor contract,



Facility has at least one memorandum of understanding or memorandum of
agreement with another location for assistance during an emergency, primarily for
receiving evacuees,



The facility can name at least one community preparedness partner,



The facility has trained staff certified in at least one level of the NIMS Incident
Command System (ICS),



At least one of three operating sections of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and
Resource Manual that have been adopted,



Facility has completed its Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA),



Facility has adopted at least one of the emergency response templates for staff
response during an emergency,



The back-up generator is connected to building security in the event of a power
failure,
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The back-up generator is connected to the elevators in the event of a power failure,



The back-up generator is connected to kitchen appliances in the event of a power
failure,



The back-up generator is connected to the refrigeration units in the event of a power
failure,



The back-up generator is connected to the heating and air-conditioning equipment
in the event of a power failure,



Certified in NIMS Incident Command System,



The back-up generator is connected to the laundry in the event of a power failure,



The communication plan includes talking to resident families during an emergency,



A facility representative has attended at least one outside preparedness planning
meeting, such as the HPP regional health care coalition meetings during the past
two years,



The facility has made arrangements with at least two healthcare or non-healthcare
related locations for sending evacuees,



Facility has at least one transportation contract for evacuation purposes,



And, at least one of the transportation vendors is beyond 50 miles,



Facility participated in at least one outside emergency exercise or drill with a
community partner,



During the past five years, the number of exercises or drills the facility has
participated in is at least one,



The facility has a medical surge plan in-place.
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A composite implementation score was calculated by summing all
identified indicators of implementation (1=yes, 0=no) resulting in possible index scores
ranging from 0-26. Actual scores ranged from 1 to 26 with the mean score of 19.06
(SD=5.505) and median score at 21.0 suggesting that half of responding organizations
have implemented nearly all of preparedness best practices.
Table 11b: Implementation Scale:
Means Comparison between Implementation Scale and Independent Variables

N

%

Mean

SD=

t=

df

p=

Bed Size
Small-Medium
Large

31
18

62.0%
36.0%

18.19
16.33

5.02
5.38

1.219 46

.229

Ownership
For-profit
Non-profit/Governmental

31
19

62.0%
38.0%

17.00
18.16

5.17
5.17

-0.769 47

.446

Region
East
West

16
34

32.0%
68.0%

19.13
16.65

3.54
5.62

1.614 47

.113

Geography
Urban
Rural

25
25

50.0%
50.0%

15.76
19.12

5.61
4.10

-2.419 47

.019

Job Title (Collapsed)
Senior Management
Other Management

27
22

54.0%
44.0%

17.22
17.64

4.83
5.72

-0.275 46

.785

Scores on the implementation scale as viewed through the multi-variate analysis found
degrees of voluntary preparedness from 60-74% implementation with the main differences
found between the rural mean of 19.12, (SD=4.10) and the mean from urban facilities of
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15.76, (SD=5.61). This indicates a difference between adoption (compliance) and
voluntary implementation.
Q. 12: What is the overall readiness of KY LTC for a no-notice emergency event?
Readiness for a no-notice disaster would involve all of the best practices for LTC
preparedness. The Adoption scale produced a mean score of 13.38 (SD=3.907) with a
median score of 14.0 on a 1-15 scale. Actual scores for the Implementation scale ranged
from 1 to 26 with the mean score of 19.06 (SD=5.505) and the median score at 21.0
suggesting that half of responding organizations have implemented

nearly all of

preparedness best practices, a score that was greater than expected. The implementation
scores find that LTC that had attended training and voluntarily integrated best practices in
their planning are not only prepared to put the CMS Final Rule for Emergency
Preparedness in place. Overall readiness to respond to a no-notice emergency event,
however, necessitates very strong evacuation planning. The mean score for the evacuation
index was only 6.6 (SD=3.09) on 1 to 14 scale with a 7.00 median score with no significant
differences on the multi-variate analysis. This finding suggests that plans may have
integrated best practices but the greatest gap, i.e. evacuation planning, is the most critical
in a no-notice situation. LTC require more training and exercising their evacuation plans
to be reasonably prepared.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

A purposive sample of ninety-one long term care facilities in Kentucky out of 284
were invited to participate in a survey about their emergency preparedness planning as of
July, 2014. Surveys from fifty (50) long term care facilities were received and analyzed.
The research questions explored facility preparedness, professional affiliations, the
number and scope of emergency preparedness and response partners, training received
and the extent of comprehensive planning respondents had in place.
The importance of this study is significant as this research provides an historic
perspective and baseline data for KYs LTC Emergency Preparedness initiatives from
which to continue to research. It documents the importance of relationship building,
personal contact and communication among all players in community resilience and
contributes to the gap in studies on no-notice events. It provides a new application of the
DOI theory to emergency preparedness and suggests the importance of change agents.
Overall, the results from this study suggest that the sample of LTC facilities that
completed the survey are very prepared for emergencies arising from no-notice events.
Specifically:


The inroads made by the KYEPA and its partners are significant in raising
the awareness of the best practices in the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and
Resource Manual Surprisingly, respondents did not become aware of the
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KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual from peers (8%)
rather from change agents. This is a departure from Rogers’ definition of
diffusion which views communication among peers as the most powerful
means of spreading an innovation.



Nearly all of the respondents reported that their facility had a
comprehensive emergency preparedness plan, including required elements.
Fewer respondents reported voluntary measures as part of their emergency
preparedness plan.



70.0% of respondents reported some degree of engaging in adoption.



Hazard Vulnerability Analyses were completed by 85% of facilities. They
reported including an average of 11 out of 17 different listed hazards in their
HVA.



Active implementation of innovation is reflected by respondents’
connections to external sources, partnership activities and collaboration
with others in their communities. The mean number of outside preparedness
partners reported was 6.67 is a relatively high number given the time and
effort required to become part of a local, regional and/or state effort.



Operational readiness was high as is the ability to shelter-in-place during a
power outage of 2-10 days. There is a significant gap for respondent
facilities in their Continuity of Operations Planning however placing them
at risk in a catastrophic event and a pandemic situation.



Scores for all categories on the evacuation index indicate the need for better
planning, and additional training and exercises. There is also a gap in
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preparedness to host evacuees from other facilities. Better planning is
needed a surge of beds and reimbursement agreements if payment sources
vary with concomitant reimbursement rates.


Over the years, Kentucky LTC have had access to a wide range of training
and emergency exercises. The analysis found that the training sponsors are
not necessarily the sponsors of emergency exercises. Perhaps HPP regional
health care coalition exercises have not integrated LTC content sufficiently
to warrant their time and effort. Anecdotal evidence suggests that regional
health care coalitions over-focus on hospital exercise requirements and do
not fully support LTC participation.



Geographic differences between urban and rural locations were the most
consistently significant for the number of CMS guidelines adopted (rural),
number of community partners (rural), and the different numbers of
exercise sponsors (rural). Rural locations also reported higher use of HVA
templates, more partners, use of guidelines, and more exercise sponsors but
not to a significant degree.



Differences between other manager and administrator scores for
implementation may be a worthwhile focus in a follow-up study with a
larger sample. The “work” of preparedness planning appears to be delegated
to facility managers and other categories. Significant differences were
found between job titles categorized as senior management and “other”
management on the number of HVA templates, number of community
partners and number of exercise sponsors with “other” management scores
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higher than senior management respondents. In addition, other managers
who attend training, participate in exercises and network with preparedness
partners scored higher on implementation measures. These are the managers
who provide operational leadership during an emergency. They report they
have the responsibility yet not the power to make important decisions about
preparedness planning priorities.


There was relatively high adoption (compliance) with regulations in-place
at the time of the survey followed by higher implementation scores than
anticipated. Correlations of participation in training and exercises found
adoption (compliance) is not correlated with training or exercises. However,
implementation is greater as the number of trainings and exercises both
increase.



Rural LTC in the sample reported greater investment in comprehensive
preparedness planning; on the other hand, the urban locations appear either
late to the awareness of the need to prepare or expect the perceived
plentitude of resources to be available when in need.



Overall readiness in emergency preparedness implementation is high in this
sample. Readiness to respond to a no-notice emergency event is high but
the greatest gap is in evacuation planning, the most critical response
challenge in a no-notice situation. LTC require more training for exercises
of their evacuation plans to be reasonably prepared.
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Trainings offered by the KYEPA either free-standing or as part of events
sponsored by the two state long term care associations are the preferred
method of gaining new knowledge about preparedness.



Survey data indicated the preference of LTC facilities to attend training that
reflect their specific issues and concerns. The difference in participation
rates between change agent offerings and more general HPP regional health
care coalition training and exercises suggests the need to offer both types
for preparedness implementation to continue longer term. These
partnerships have proven to be a powerful dissemination approach which
led to adoption and implementation. These partnerships should be
continued.

Limitations of the Study
This study is not without its limitations. The study used a purposive sampling
approach to identify facilities with at least minimum exposure to emergency preparedness.
Thus, sample selection was only able to target one-third of KY LTC facilities versus the
entire population of facilities. The resulting final sample of fifty facilities limited the scope
and level of the data analysis. Future studies should include all KY LTC in their adoption
and implementation now that the CMS Final Rule has been enacted. Due to the concrete
nature of emergency preparedness, a large number of activities were identified and
measured, but no standardized measures were used. Finally, the study did not start out to
explicitly test, apply, or operationalize Rogers theory of diffusion of innovation theory or
its concepts. The relevance of Rogers’ theory was only retrospectively applied in the
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course of the data analysis and discussion of the results. Therefore, the findings related to
adoption and implementation should be viewed in that context.
Practice Implications
The findings of this study suggest that local, state and federal expectations of LTC
facility preparedness and capacity to respond in no-notice emergencies are unrealistic.
While LTC facilities prepare to become compliant with the scope of the CMS Final Rule,
supporting agencies such as CMS, ASPR and FEMA as well as state departments for public
health and emergency management do not consider the industry as part of critical
infrastructure as they do hospitals. As such, they still look to LTC facilities to be selfsufficient. Self-sufficiency is less realistic than resilience. There will never be enough
transportation assets to respond to a true community disaster. Everyone will be on their
own until federal resources arrive, which usually would take 3-5 days. Therefore, the
importance of resilience in the capacity to shelter-in-place for LTC facilities is the number
one priority in terms of operational resources and staffing, communication resources and
planning, and sufficient supplies of water, food, medications, and fuel for back-up
generators. Emergency managers now talk about having on reserve a 7-10 day instead of
the 3-day supply of critical resources as currently required by regulations. Storage of that
amount of supplies is a challenge for many if not most facilities. However, good planning
with vendors beyond the 50-mile range and relationships with county emergency managers
may offset some of the risk of storing less than optimum supplies.
This is not to lessen the need for better evacuation planning or more frequent
evacuation exercises for facilities. Since this is the biggest challenge, it deserves the most
consistent practice through exercises. With staff turnover a challenge for all LTC facilities,
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at least annual evacuation exercises should occur for all staff on all shifts. The CMS Final
Rule and its emphasis on Memoranda of Understanding provides impetus for LTC facilities
to establish as many agreements with potential receiving sites as feasible. In Kentucky, this
would necessitate a statewide reach since there may not be sufficient beds to respond in a
true disaster.
Future Research
There continues to be a great need for more research on no-notice disaster events,
especially outside of the research on hospital mass fatality response. Funds are scarce for
researching emergency preparedness in non-hospital settings such as LTC facilities. What
research is available is from study of anticipated events, such as hurricanes. Therefore,
building on the current study, follow-up studies of emergency preparedness are warranted
especially of no-notice emergency states, especially now with the advent of comprehensive
new federal regulations.
The questions around diffusion suggest that further research on the role of change
agents in the diffusion process may be worthwhile. The study highlights the significant
impact of change agents on adoption and implementation with LTC as a target population.
In view of the importance and scope of the new regulations, LTC needs as many trusted
resources as possible that can use their language and assuage their concerns to meet the
CMS timetable. Diffusion of Innovation is a very appropriate theory to utilize in adoption
of new regulations regardless of the field. It can also be useful with groups or organizations
serving vulnerable populations to prepare them for an emergency where there is a gap in
regulation or no regulation, e.g. HUD-funded housing for older persons.
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Federal efforts remain too militaristic in their language and approach. And, health
care coalitions remain over-focused on hospitals needs without considering how to
effectively engage LTC and keep them engaged. Continued research on these efforts is
another worthwhile area for exploration as ASPR shifts their emphasis to self-sufficient
coalitions. The greater questions revolve around the effectiveness and sufficiency of the
CMS Final Rule regulations not only as written but in practice during disasters.
Conclusion
Kentucky LTC facilities have identified a process of knowledge gathering and
partnerships that contribute to enhanced emergency preparedness. It appears that the lower
access to community resources has produced greater preparedness or resilience in no-notice
emergency events. The facilities will require even more intense access to training and
emergency exercises as they implement the CMS Final Rule regulations. If those resources
become available, Kentucky long term care facilities are likely to utilize them and thus
maintain the safety and quality of care of their residents under the most difficult of threats.
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SURVEY INSTRUMENT
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Kentucky Emergency Preparedness for Long Term Care
Purpose: The purpose of this survey is to understand the current status of Kentucky Long
Term Care in emergency preparedness planning. This survey intends to assess current
Kentucky Long Term Care readiness to respond to any and all emergencies.
Directions: We request that the person/s most knowledgeable about the facility
emergency preparedness planning complete the survey to the best of your ability
based on your facility’s current emergency plan.
Facility Name: ___________________________________________________________
County: ___________________
1. Current job title
Administrator
Assistant Administrator
Director of Nursing
Facilities Manager
Other (Please Specify):
__________________________________________________________________
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN
2. Does your facility have a comprehensive emergency preparedness plan?
Yes
No
Don’t know
3. During the last two (2) years, have you made changes to your facility emergency
preparedness plan?
Yes
No
Don’t know
4. Has your facility completed a Hazard Vulnerability Analysis?
Yes
No
Don’t know
5. Does your facility emergency preparedness plan address different types of disasters
based on your Hazard Vulnerability Analysis? (check all that apply):
Bioterrorist Event (e.g. anthrax)
Bomb Threat
Earthquake
Extended Power Outage
Extreme Temperatures
Flooding
Hazardous Materials
Hurricane

Resident Elopement
Severe Thunder Storm
Sink Holes
Tornado
Water Shortage
Wildfire
Winter Storms
Other Disease Outbreak
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(e.g. SARS)_____________
Facility Fire
Pandemic Influenza

Ice Storms
Other (Please Specify):
____________________

6. Are you aware of the UK/U of L KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource
Manual?
Yes
No
Don’t know

If yes, from whom did you first hear about the manual? (Check all that apply)
UK/UofL LTC Training

County Emergency
Manager
State Long Term Care Association
KY LTC Ombudsman
Program
Regional Hospital Preparedness Coalition
KY Office of Inspector
General
Local Health Department
KY Dept. for Public
Health
A peer in the field or facility (Please Specify their role:
_______________________
Other (Please Specify):
_____________________________________________________
7. Has your facility adopted any or all of the UK/UofL KY All Hazards LTC
Emergency Planning Manual?
Yes
No
Don’t know
 If yes, what percentage (%) of your facility emergency preparedness plan would
you estimate has been adopted from the KY All Hazards LTC Resource and Planning
Manual?
0%
100%

1-20%

21-40%

41-60%

61-80%

81-

If yes, does your plan include any of the following? (Check all that apply)
Emergency Response Disaster Templates /Job Tasks
Employee Personal Readiness
Facility Operations

8. Has your facility adopted the CMS recommended guidelines found in the KY All
Hazards LTC Resource and Planning Manual, to include? (Check all that apply)
Facility personnel names and contact information
Characteristics and needs of residents, e.g., acuity
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Contact information of local and state emergency managers
A facility organization chart
Building construction and Life Safety systems information
9.

Has your facility established an All Hazards Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)?
Yes
No
Don’t know

10. Has your facility been certified in any or all of the NIMS ICS modules? (Check all
that apply)
ICS 100
ICS 200
ICS 700
ICS 800
COMMUNICATION
11. Have you discussed emergency preparedness planning and coordination with any of
the following agencies/officials? (Check all that apply)
County Emergency Management
Local Hospitals
KY Emergency Management
State Professional or advocacy
organization (e.g., state
County Emergency Operations Center
KY Emergency Operations Center
National Professional or advocacy
organization
Local Health Department
(e.g., American Health Care
Association; Leading Age )
KY Dept. for Public Health
UK/UofL Emergency Preparedness &
Aging Program
Hospital Preparedness Program Coalition
Other Universities or Academic Medical
Centers
Local Energy Provider
Red Cross
Fire Department
KY Office of Inspector General
Surveyor
Police Department
KY LTC Ombudsman Program
Hospice Facilities
Don’t know
None of the above
Other (Please Specify):
____________________
During the last two (2) years, what is the approximate number of state, regional and/or
local meetings attended by a representative of your facility per year, related to emergency
preparedness planning? __________
12. Does your facility have a communication plan in place for emergencies?
Yes
No
Don’t know
13. Do you discuss emergency preparedness plans with your residents’ families?
Yes
No
Don’t know
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If yes, please share what types of communications, (e.g. initial admission,

Family Nite, newsletters,
etc.)______________________________________________________________
____________________
14. Do you discuss personal and family emergency preparedness planning with your
staff?
Yes
No
Don’t know

If yes, please share what types of communications, (e.g. new employee

orientation, staff training,
newsletters,
etc.)____________________________________________________________________
15. What is your primary mode of communication with your staff during an emergency?
Ham Radios
Land phone lines
Mobile
phones
Satellite phones
Walkie-talkies
Smart
Phone (e.g., Blackberry)
Other (Please Specify):
__________________________________________________________________
16. What is your primary mode of communication with outside authorities during a
disaster?
Ham Radios
Land phone lines
Mobile
phones
Satellite phones
Walkie-talkies
Smart
Phone (e.g., Blackberry)
Other (Please Specify):
__________________________________________________________________
17. What is your primary mode of communication with residents’ families during a
disaster?
Ham Radios
Land phone lines
Mobile
phones
Satellite phones
Walkie-talkies
Smart
Phone (e.g., iPhone)
Other (Please Specify):
________________________________________________________ _________
18. If your facility has had an evacuation in the last two (2) years, did you have any
contact with your county Emergency Manager?
Yes
No
Don’t know
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19. If your facility has had an evacuation in the last 2 years, did you have any contact
with the KY. Dept. for Public Health?
Yes
No
Don’t know
FACILTY OPERATIONS
20. Does your facility have an on-site emergency generator?
Yes
No
Don’t know

If yes, what type of fuel does it require?
Diesel
Natural Gas
________________________

Propane

Other

 Which of your facility’s functions rely on generator power in the event of a power
outage?

(Check all that apply)
Resident critical care functions (such as oxygen)
Heat
Laundry facilities
Air Conditioning
Emergency lighting
Refrigeration
Cooking Elements
Elevators
Monitoring/Security systems (e.g., WanderGuard®)
Other (Please Specify): ________________________

 How long (in hours) are you able to maintain power supply without receiving
additional fuel from outside sources?
________________________________________________________

 Do you have a contract to receive additional fuel for your generator during an
emergency?
Yes

No

Don’t know

If you have contracts to receive additional fuel, are any of the suppliers

outside of a 50 mile radius?
Yes

No

Don’t know

21. How many days is your facility able to shelter-in-place when there is a power outage?
One
Two – Three
Four – Six
Seven – Ten
More than Ten
Don’t know
22. How many days supply of non-perishable food does your facility have stored in case
of a power outage?
One
Two – Three
Four – Six
Seven – Ten
More than Ten
Don’t know
23. How many days supply of emergency drinking water does your facility have if you
lose water?
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One
Seven – Ten

Two – Three
More than Ten

Four – Six
Don’t know

24.How is your emergency water supply maintained on site? (Check all that apply)
Bottled water (individual size)
Not stored on site
Bottled water (gallon/gallon+)
Contract with vendor to provide water
during an emergency
Chemically treated (e.g. bleach, First Water System)
Separate water tank, carbon filtered
Separate water tank, non-carbon filtered
None of the above
Other (Please Specify): ____________
Don’t know
25. Does your facility use electronic medical records?
Yes
No
Still working on it

If yes, are you able to access your electronic medical records off site?
Yes

No

Don’t know

Still working on it

EVACUATION
26. Does your facility have a plan for resident evacuation to another healthcare facility?
Yes
No
Don’t know
Within 50 miles
Outside
50 miles

If there is another healthcare facility where your residents will be transferred in

case of an evacuation, what type of facility is it? (Check all that apply)

LTC (Sister Facility)
Hospital
LTC (Non-Sister Facility)
Independent Living Facility
Assisted Living Facility
Hospice Facility
Other (Please Specify): _____________________________________

What type of agreements do you have in place with other healthcare facilities

where your residents may be transferred in case of an evacuation? (Check all that
apply)
Contract

Memorandum of Understanding

Mutual Aid Agreement

None of the Above
Don’t Know
Other (Please Specify):
____________________________________________________________

Do you have reimbursement arrangements in place with these facilities for the
hosting of your residents?
Yes

No
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Don’t know

27. Do you have arrangements in place to transfer your residents to non-healthcare
facilities in
case of an evacuation?
Yes

No

Don’t know

If yes, what type of non-healthcare facilities do you have arrangements to
transfer your residents to in case of an evacuation?
Church
School
Community Recreation Center
Red Cross Shelter
Other (Please Specify): _________________________________

28. Do you have contracts with transportation providers in the event of an evacuation?
Yes
No
Don’t know

If yes, what type(s) of providers? (Check all that apply)
Ambulance Service

Bus Company – local schools
Bus Company – commercial

Non-Emergency Transport
Vehicle
Wheelchair Accessible
Vehicle
Other facility-owned
vehicles
Community agencies

Churches
Vendors beyond 50 miles: __________________
Other (Please Specify):
___________________________________________________________________

If yes, what are the names of the transportation providers with whom you have
contracts?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
SURGE PLANNING
29. Does your facility have a surge plan to host evacuees from another healthcare
facility, such as LTC or a hospital?
Yes
No
Don’t know
30. Has your facility ever hosted evacuees from other LTC experiencing an emergency?
Yes
No
Don’t know
EXPERIENCE WITH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TRAINING AND
DRILLS/EXERCISES
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31. In the past two (2) years, how many times has your facility participated in disaster
drills/exercises (other than fire drills)?
None
One
Two
Three
Four
More than four

If yes, what agency/group managed the exercise? (Check all that apply)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Kentucky Emergency Management Agency
County Emergency Management
UK/U of L LTC Training
KY State LTC Association
Regional Hospital Preparedness Coalition (HPP)
Local Health Department
KY Dept. for Public Health

State Emergency
Operations
Center
County Emergency
Operations
Center
Fire Department
Police Department
Corporate Office
Red Cross
Other (Please Specify):
___________________________

32. Have you personally participated in any disaster planning/emergency training other
than at
your facility?
Yes
No
Don’t know

If yes, who provided the training? (Check all that apply)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Kentucky Emergency Management Agency
County Emergency Management
UK/U of L LTC Training
Nursing Home Association
Regional Hospital Preparedness Coalition
Local Health Department
KY Dept. for Public Health
Other (Please Specify):

KY LTC state
association
County Emergency
Operations Center
Fire Department
Police Department
Corporate Office
Red Cross
KY Office of
Inspector General

__________________________________________________________
33. List any additional training you or your facility would like to have available related
to long term care emergency preparedness: __________________________________
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Please share any additional information you would like with the researchers to improve
the Kentucky Emergency Preparedness for Aging and LTC Program?

This survey was based on the work of David Hammond, P.hD, Hilary Eiring, Ph.D and
Sarah Blake, Ph.D; Department of Health Policy & Management, Rollins School of
Public Health, Emory University. We appreciate their generosity in allowing us the
opportunity to adapt their material.
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Appendix B

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the KY Department for Public Health, Preparedness Branch.
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